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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
TURKEY’S BORON EXPERIENCE 
 
Okan, Menekşe 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Dr. Paul Williams 
 
 
 
September 2008 
 
 
 
This master thesis aims to analyze the utilization of boron deposits in Turkey 
and to elaborate Turkey’s performance in deriving economic benefits from 
boron production. This research finds out that there is not a prescribed 
contribution of natural resources to economic development unless the resources 
are associated with comprehensive policies that are placing the investment in 
knowledge in the forefront. In this regard, this thesis asserts that, deriving 
significant contributions for its economy depends on Turkey’s ability in 
knowledge creation for high value added production rather than geological 
endowment. 
Keywords: natural resources, economic development, institutions, boron 
minerals 
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ÖZET 
 
 
DOĞAL KAYNAKLARIN EKONOMİK KALKINMADAKİ ROLÜ: 
TÜRKİYE’NİN BOR DENEYİMİ 
 
Okan, Menekşe 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Ass. Prof. Dr. Paul Williams 
 
 
 
Eylül 2008 
 
 
 
Bu yüksek lisans tez çalışması, Türkiye’nin bor kaynaklarını değerlendirmesini 
ve bor üretiminden ekonomik fayda sağlamadaki performansını analiz etmeyi 
amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, doğal kaynakları, bilgi odaklı yatırımları ön plana 
çıkaran kapsamlı politikalarla desteklemedikçe, bu kaynakların ekonomik 
kalkınmaya katkıda bulunamayacağını tespit eder. Bu kapsamda, bu tez, bor 
kaynaklarından önemli faydalar sağlayabilmenin, Türkiye’nin yüksek katma 
değerli bir üretim için bilgi üretebilme kabiliyetine bağlı olduğunu 
savunmaktadır. 
  
Anahtar kelimeler: doğal kaynaklar, ekonomik kalkınma, kurumlar, bor 
madenleri 
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CHAPTER I 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Turkey holds the largest boron deposits in the world that is estimated to be 
%64 of proved boron reserves and also is sufficient to meet current global 
boron demand around 400 years alone.  In terms of its reserve potential, 
variety of boron minerals, tenor quality of the deposits and low extraction 
costs, boron minerals have implied for Turkey to be one of the promising 
sources of economic development for long years. What is striking about the 
issue is that, Turkey has not generated the expected benefits from its natural 
endowment in boron minerals, which are considered to be the one of the most 
important and valuable resources of Turkey.  In this regard, the purpose of this 
thesis is to analyze the utilization of boron deposits in Turkey and to elaborate 
Turkey’s ability in driving economic benefits from boron production. 
 
 2 
 Boron production in Turkey started in the mid 19th century with foreign 
entrepreneurship.  Until the nationalization of boron mining in 1978, private 
producers and state enterprise continued boron production.  The outstanding 
rationale of nationalization has been designated to increase Turkey’s share of 
boron production and to capture more weight in the world boron market, 
where USA stands as the major boron producer.  Even after the 
nationalization, Turkey’s income from boron production has not been 
proportional to its potential in its reserves and tenor quality of its boron 
minerals. After the nationalization of boron mining, the state enterprise Eti in 
Turkey and U.S. Borax, Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of UK based Rio 
Tinto) in USA together make up %75 of total world production.  Despite the 
proximity in the production shares of Eti’s and U.S. Borax’s, that are %35 and 
%40 respectively, Eti’s share in boron revenues of the world market is %20-23 
whereas that of U.S. Borax is %65-70.  The difference between their 
respective shares in boron income is a result of the fact that USA is specialized 
in boron processing and derives its income from refined boron exports; 
whereas boron ore exports have been the main source of Turkey’s earnings 
from boron sales for long years.   
 
The literature on the contributions of natural resources to economic growth 
establishes the central role of mineral policies that are supplementary to 
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natural endowment.  Based on the idea that resource industry may display skill 
and knowledge spill-over across industries by generating forward and 
backward linkages, the shift towards high value added production from basic 
mining activities is the real potential of mineral industries.  The value of raw 
mineral exports is far less than the value of advanced forms of production.  
Accordingly, complementing the resource wealth with knowledge and skills 
provides  the  principal  impetus  for development during the utilization of 
resources.  In this regard, boron production in Turkey is a significant case to 
be analyzed in defining the scope of contributions of resource wealth to 
domestic economy.   
 
Boron minerals are used in hundreds of products and processes by diverse 
industries in various application areas such as magnetic devices, fuel cells, 
rocket and flight fuels, heat storage, fiber optic, fiberglass, photography, 
nuclear applications, cleaning chemicals, metallurgy, flame retardants, 
construction, cement, waste disposal and health.  In the recent years, the 
studies on the hydrogen energy systems, in which sodium boron hydride is 
used as a hydrogen carrier and heat storage, indicates an increasing potential 
for boron minerals.  The determining role of science in boron products is a 
result of basic physical and chemical features of the mineral.  Usage of boron 
in diverse industries depends on its synthesis with other elements and 
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materials. In this respect, value of boron compounds and special boron 
products vary according to their chemical composition; thus the income from 
export of a boron product is not determined according to the amount of boron 
mineral used in it, but according to the input of chemical and industrial 
knowledge used for its production.  In light of these facts about boron mineral, 
adopting a value-added strategy with heavy emphasis on science and 
technology has an essential role in utilizing boron minerals for industrial and 
economic purposes. That is why; this thesis agrees that the development of 
Turkey’s boron industry depends on the knowledge creation for more 
advanced products rather than geological endowment. 
 
Building mineral policies which utilize resource abundance for development 
of human capital and advanced research activities can lessen dependency on 
primary commodity exports and pave the way for diversification around a 
value-added production and exports base.  Mineral policies establish the role 
and function of the state and market forces over mineral use.  As the 
institutions establish the legal and regulatory framework governing the use of 
resources, they provide incentives and the opportunities for resource use, 
either for primary commodity exports or higher value-added production.   
. 
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With the purpose of testing how the resource endowment contributes to 
economic development, Turkey’s boron case is suitable to highlight the 
importance of which mechanisms determine the level of success or failure in 
generating contributions to domestic economy. The boron case of Turkey 
reveals that abundance of a mineral does not necessarily lead to correspondent 
revenues from its production and exports unless some distinctive value is 
added to the products. The advantages or flaws of the institutional design and 
the positive or negative externalities of the regulatory framework play the 
prevailing role in generating economic wealth from resources.  
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: The second Chapter provides an 
insight to the theoretical framework by elaborating the role of the natural 
resources in contribution to economic growth and development.  It indicates 
the importance of the mineral policies and related institutions in utilization of 
the resources. The legal and regulatory framework governing mineral 
production is explained under three categories: insufficient regulation, state as 
the coordinator, and over-regulation.  The characteristics and tendencies of 
each regulatory framework are explained; and boron policy of Turkey is 
placed under the over-regulatory category. 
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In Chapter III, the factors leading Turkey’s boron production towards an over-
regulatory framework are explored.  Besides to external, economic and 
political factors, ‘mineral value’ is identified as a source for over-regulatory 
boron management.  Deacon and Mueller (2004: 12) express that “the natural 
resource curse literature raises the novel possibility that a nation’s natural 
resource endowment may influence the political system in adopts”.  While this 
preposition points to a larger linkage between resource endowment and the 
formation of country’s basic governing institutions, it has inspired this thesis 
to explore how the value and the importance attached to the mineral affect and 
change the formation of mineral-related institutions, policies and regulations.  
This approach is instrumental in analyzing over-regulatory boron management 
in Turkey given that the state has gradually assumed a coordinator role for 
other kinds of industrial minerals. 
 
The institutional design for boron production in Turkey is explained in 
Chapter IV.  The fundamental elements of over-regulatory framework 
comprising the scope of nationalization law, structure and competence of state 
enterprise and relevant policy instruments are presented in order to identify 
how the established policy has determined the extent of boron utilization. 
After evaluating the utilization of boron deposits in line with the advantages 
and limitations set out with the institutional design, Chapter V explores the 
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contribution of boron endowment to domestic economy. The evaluation of the 
current economic weight of boron exports in the context of Turkey’s overall 
exports designates that the significance attached to boron deposits is greater 
than its actual weight in domestic economy.   
 
The conclusion Chapter asserts that, in the long-run, the achievement of 
Turkey in the world boron market needs to be assessed according to the 
diversity, quality and distinction of its products. The disproportion between 
Turkey’s boron production and its export income reflects this urgent necessity. 
The thesis reaches a conclusion that Turkey needs to find a balanced approach 
between state-managed and market-led production in a way that is conducive 
to diversify into high value added boron products.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO  
NATURAL RESOURCES, INSTITUTIONS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
The role of the natural resources in contribution to economic growth and 
development has been a matter of debate in the recent literature.  The findings 
about the negative implications of resource abundance on development 
dynamics are challenging to the idea of resource-based development. As Auty 
indicated, "since the 1960s the resource-rich developing countries have under-
performed compared with the resource deficient economies" (Auty, 1998: 
viii).  The economic explanations for the under-performance of many 
resource-rich countries explore the source of the problem as the inherent 
characteristic of resource sector.  Resource-based activities are assumed to be 
inferior to manufacturing because of the low elasticity of world demand, 
which leads to a deterioration in the long-run trend of relative prices, their lack 
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of technological intensity and their vulnerability to boom and bust cycles.  The 
political explanations for under-performance locate the source of the problem 
in the inherent characteristic of resource wealth which generates sufficient 
revenues to lower incentives to promote domestic development.  Moreover, 
government actors engage in rent-seeking and avoid accountability pressures 
when national budgets are based on revenues from resource exports, not on 
domestic taxation. In contrast to the many examples of resource-rich but 
economically poor developing countries, some of the world's richest countries, 
such as Australia, Canada, Finland, Sweden, and the United States, have 
developed and used mineral industries as a platform for broader industrial 
development (Wright and Czelusta, 2002) implying  that resource abundance 
and wealth need not be detrimental for economic development.  Accordingly, 
the answer to why some resource-rich countries perform well and others do 
not should be embedded in an intervening casual variable between the 
resource endowment and economic performance.  
 
Resource abundance and wealth are direct sources of neither economic under-
performance nor development.  The instruments by which the resources are 
utilized in order to generate income and by which the resource wealth is re-
distributed, better determine how the resource endowment and resource wealth 
will affect the performance of the overall economy.  These instruments and 
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mechanisms are the output of the institutions within the country.  As the 
institutions establish the legal and regulatory framework governing the use of 
resources, they provide incentives and the opportunities for resource use, 
either for primary commodity exports or higher value-added production or 
both.  In this way, institutions can expose the economy to, or shield the 
economy from, negative externalities such as dependence on primary exports 
and boom-bust cycles, established by the resource curse hypothesis.  For 
instance, building comprehensive public policies which utilize resource 
abundance for development of human capital and advanced research activities 
can lessen dependency on primary commodity exports and pave the way for 
diversification around a value-added production and exports base.  On the 
distribution side of resource wealth, institutions play an important role in 
framing how the wealth will be allocated among the domestic actors and 
sectors. 
 
On the basis of the assumption that institutional quality, which refers to the 
rule of law, political stability, governmental effectiveness, control of 
corruption, effective regulation, secure property rights and rule-based 
governance, is an important component of a sustained and equitable socio- 
economic development, deriving long-term advantage from mineral 
endowment depends on the broader sphere of endogenous institutions and 
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political-economic context.  While these domestic dynamics are crucially 
important in providing instruments and mechanisms for deriving benefits from 
the resources, particular arrangements for production and related activities can 
be adopted for specific minerals to control the risks and opportunities 
associated with the global political economy.   
 
Differential distributions of resources around the world underlie the scope of 
domestic practices in accordance with the international political economic 
conditions. Export restrictions, which are designed or intended to regulate 
resource management as a tool of political leverage, are the salient examples 
of such practices. OPEC's oil embargo on Israel and its allies during the Arab-
Israeli war and the US strategic minerals embargo on Soviet bloc during the 
Cold War underscore the interaction between international politics and 
commodity-specific regulations.  As Zacher puts it, "One of the central issues 
in international political economy of natural resources has always been the 
ability of states controlling strategic materials to pressure importers to make 
'political concessions' as a price for receiving the resource" (Zacher, 1988: xii).  
The fuels and minerals which are crucially important for industrial and 
military power and considered strategic minerals (Haglund, 1986: 221) can be 
affected in terms of output and price levels of producer countries.   
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Apart from specific regulations imposed on mineral-related activities to 
achieve international political goals, the unique value of a specific mineral that 
originates from the dynamics of demand in the world market can also affect 
the mineral policies and regulations of the producer countries.  Export 
opportunities, which are based on the abundance and often relatively low 
production and transportation costs, and stem from international demand, 
combined with production opportunities can bring forth particular domestic 
concern for a mineral; thus it may lead to a specific policy for the utilization of 
that mineral.  It is to say that besides the political and strategic value, the 
economic value of a mineral has an affect on the shaping of the instruments 
through which the resource is utilized to reach the expected returns.   
 
On the linkage between the institutions and resources, Isham et al. (2003: 26) 
indicates that, “Institutions surely matter a lot, but types of natural resource 
endowments and  the corresponding export structures to which they give rise, 
play a large role in shaping what kinds of institutional forms exist and persist". 
 
Deacon and Mueller (2004: 4) note that "the natural resource curse literature 
raises the novel possibility that a nation's natural resource endowment may 
influence the political system it adopts".  While this statement points to a 
broader linkage between resource endowment and formation of a country's 
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fundamental governing institutions, we can also explore how the economic 
value and weight of the mineral can affect and change the formation of 
mineral-related institutions, policies and regulations, without having to look 
into the less tractable and more complicated analysis of how this shapes the 
larger political system. This approach enables analysis of different 
management structures designed for different minerals within the same 
country.   The casual relationship between the antecedent factors, institutional 
design of the mineral management and contribution to domestic economy is 
laid out in Figure I.  
 
Figure I    Consequential steps towards contribution to domestic economy 
e 
External factors     Institutional ofMineral 
Economic factors        
         
                 
 
        
  
 
 
 
Mineral Value 
 
External Factors 
 
Economic Factors  
 
Political Factors 
Institutional Design of Mineral 
Management 
Mineral Utilization 
Contribution to Domestic Economy 
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The course of resource-based development needs to be assessed in conjunction 
with the international factors that influence these processes.  Being in a more 
sophisticated world market-different from the experiences of today’s 
developed countries- the resource rich developing countries are more 
constrained by the structure of the world market.  As long as they remain 
followers in the system, they remain vulnerable to international factors that are 
determined and/or caused by multiple external actors, both on the demand and 
supply side.  In order to decrease this vulnerability and increase their control 
over the global market, they face two alternative paths.  The first is influencing 
prices through supply reductions if the producer country has significant market 
share.  Given increases in the number of alternative supply channels and 
advancements in transportation, a single country does not seem to hold such 
leverage unless its resources have a distinct product quality.  Therefore an 
open or a secret agreement or cartel among the producers of the same 
resources is required in order to create an influential position vis-à-vis the 
consuming countries. "Through restricted competition, oligopoly offers 
producers higher than normal rents plus greater market control and 
predictability" (Shafer, 1983:127).  Significantly, the number of the producers 
and their shares in the market determine the success of this kind of policy.  
Controlling the supply and manipulating prices at best in the short-term yields 
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increased export earnings.  The second path to decrease vulnerability is 
reducing dependence on raw material exports by promotion of human 
development, research and investment in skills with adequate public policies.  
This requires domestic capacity building along with national learning.  
Therefore it would take a longer period of time to get the same level of returns 
from this policy as by attempting to manipulate raw material prices. 
 
The path, by which a country seeks to improve its position in the global 
market, constitutes its development strategy, which basically refers to the 
appropriate actions and interventions that are used to promote defined 
development objectives.  The economic and political significance of the 
resource, internationally and domestically, presents the potential benefits that 
are to be gained by the producer country; therefore affect the formation of the 
specified objectives around these foreseeable benefits.  For instance, the 
relative abundance of mineral deposits, greater foreign demand than domestic 
demand, favorable commodity prices and price trends, and low transportation 
costs may produce an export mentality resulting in neglect of other domestic 
sectors.  On the contrary, discovery of mineral deposits, products of which 
have a wide range of use within the country, may lead to utilization of the 
minerals in a way to assist development of domestic industries.  It is possible 
to cite other examples with the combination of the conditions in a single 
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country’s domestic economy and that of the world market.  The approach 
focusing the extent and nature of the contributions that mineral industry  can 
make to overall economy determines the path by which the country chooses to 
develop and utilize its resources.   
 
The contribution that mining can make to overall growth is not limited to 
gaining economic surplus through export revenues.  Mining sector has the 
potential to create employment, provide raw materials for various branches of 
domestic industry, generate financial flows through the state’s collection of 
taxes and customs duties, and generate broader linkages to the domestic 
economy.  Backward linkages are generated through investments in domestic 
production of inputs, machinery, technological upgrading and transportation 
functions.  Forward linkages occur with investments in industries which are 
using the output of the mineral industry; thus these generate possibilities for 
further processing of the minerals and lead to increasing value-added in the 
mineral products.  These linkage effects determine the range of investment 
opportunities in domestic economy and the extent of diversification around the 
production and export base.  The significance of the resource lies in its “tying 
in of one activity with another, the way in which [the resource] sets the general 
pace, creates new activities and is itself strengthened by its own creation” 
(Watkins, 1963: 144).   
 17 
Inclination to generate export revenues or recognition of the spread effects of 
mineral industry determines the chosen mineral utilization strategy.  It is to say 
that the domestic understanding about the potentials of resource industry 
determines how the domestic resource sector will or will not be used as an 
asset for virtuous development.  In short, the specified objectives shape the 
formation of mineral policy.  Mineral policy is carried out by domestic 
institutions, especially by the mineral-specific institutions which are assessed 
to be the most effective to promote the established objectives.  Accordingly, 
the institutional design of mineral production and management is crucial in 
assessing the relation between the mineral deposits, economic activities and 
economic returns from the sector.   
 
The legal and regulatory framework governing resource ownership, extraction, 
production and development basically encourages the "chosen" goals, while at 
the same time; it discourages and restricts the use of alternative utilization 
models that might have yielded other benefits and costs.  The negative side-
effects and the shortcomings of the institutional setting, if not minimized or 
compensated by the chosen model, may slow down or hinder the development 
of the resource industry, or even distort the overall economy because of 
misallocation of revenues, over-dependence on commodity exports or 
reluctance to promote domestic development.  Though not necessarily having 
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negative side effects, the role of the institutions is not limited to what is 
intended; it also extends to creating a suitable environment for further progress 
via the development of human capital, inducement of knowledge spill-over, 
transfer of skills from the resource sector to other sectors, and technological 
progress and innovation.  
 
Mineral policy and related institutions basically include ownership structure 
and mining rights.  It formally establishes which actors will play dominant 
roles by pointing to the relative influence of the state and market forces over 
mineral use.  This establishment is important in terms of asserting which 
actors are supposed to be the best to run a desirable utilization of resources 
and to promote development.  These actors include private entrepreneurs, state 
and central governments, local authorities or a corporatist model. According to 
the position that is set by the institutional framework and policy-induced 
structures, these actors carry out distinctly assigned roles and their learning 
and performance evolves within this framework.  The legal and regulatory 
framework governing mining rights, such as the access to and control over 
minerals and other means of production can be categorized as insufficient 
regulation, state coordination, and state acquisition/over-regulation.  Table I 
summarizes the main features of each framework also by referring to the 
domestic context within which it is established. 
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Table I                     Types of institutional framework for mineral production 
 
Type:              Insufficient regulation    State as the coordinator    Over-regulation 
 
Power distribution   : group rivalries       diffuse (decentralized)      state-dominated 
 
Institutional quality : weak   good                               weak/ moderate 
 
Actors relied on      : none   state and private     state 
 
Mining institutions : weak               powerful     powerful 
 
Main                       : rentier effects          spill-over effects            dependence on 
tendencies          commodity exports 
 
        underdevelopment     innovation              slow learning process 
 
         civil conflict              knowledge   bureaucratic failures 
       accumulation                and rentier effects 
   
 
 
 
 
Insufficient regulation arises in the absence of a state capacity to enforce a 
coherent and feasible mineral policy.  Under-regulation may occur in several 
circumstances.  Firstly, the mineral deposits may be left undiscovered due to 
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underdevelopment of the domestic economy or socio-political unrest within 
the country.  Neither the state nor the private entrepreneurial class may be 
strong enough to initiate resource activities and investments.  Also the 
domestic environment may not be suitable for establishing an economic and 
development policy due to political competition such as civil war or party 
politics.   
 
Secondly, in the wake of a discovery of deposits, domestic groups may fight 
for access and control over the resources, which sometimes lead to civil strife, 
given the condition that the state does not have the means to restore order and 
is not capable of ensuring control over the resources.  In such circumstances, 
mineral abundance causes a decay of institutional quality.  Civil wars over the 
control of natural resources, as in Nigeria, Angola and Congo, are the concrete 
examples of destruction of institutions (Mehlum, et al, 2005: 4).   
 
Thirdly, poor financial systems and inefficient audit mechanisms may inhibit 
the state from collecting taxes and fees even if the extraction of minerals is 
initiated by private domestic or foreign actors. The fundamental economic, 
political and social structures of backward countries expose an impediment to 
the utilization of resources for the goal of overall development.  The weak 
state capacity leads to a failure in formation of a sound mineral policy and a 
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failure in establishment and promotion of institutions.  This inability results in 
insufficient management or regulation to extract economic benefits from the 
mineral deposits for overall economy.  Even if the mining activities are 
initiated, the resource wealth is exposed to power rivalries and rent-seeking 
activities since the respective roles and positions of the domestic actors are not 
established and secured by sound institutions.  Therefore in the case of 
insufficient regulation, a contribution of the mineral deposits to the overall 
economic development is quite low. 
 
State emerges as the coordinator of mineral production and related activities 
according to the balance that it establishes between the public and private 
sectors.  The private entrepreneurs are the key actors perceived as most 
capable of making an optimum allocation of resources and development-
promoting utilization of the minerals.  Some state involvement may arise at the 
early stages of the resource industry, where the initial investment costs are 
high; for this reason the public enterprises may be used as a catalyst for private 
investment.  The instruments of the state involvement are aimed at creating a 
favorable climate for development of private sector's activities by providing a 
set of financial incentives to encourage private initiative (Bouin and Michalet, 
1991: 32).  
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The difference between this facilitative kind of involvement and state-
dominated production of the resources is embedded in their prospected 
structures that the governments aim to reach gradually. With the regulatory 
and institutional framework, the state basically defines its role not in 
opposition to the private sector.  The state gradually transfers the industry to 
the private sector and provides the basic legal and institutional foundations for 
the development of the resource-based industry.   
 
Another kind of involvement may arise, i.e., whereby the state considers it 
necessary to secure stable supplies of resources that are vital for domestic 
industries.  Although the state may choose to continue its involvement in 
mining activities, it does not ban other actors from the sector by law and it 
performs its activities like a private firm in a competitive environment.  The 
state ensures consistency in mineral policy and the financial means to attract 
investments into the sector and to secure the continual improvement of 
existing business.  Besides these, the coordinator state implements a sound 
taxation policy and an accurate supervisory mechanism.  Establishment of 
research institutes and creation of intellectual property rights system are the 
other means of state coordination.  While this design appears to be the most 
“virtuous” and self-reinforcing one in terms of development, its formation and 
functioning depend on the presence of a sufficiently strong and dynamic 
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entrepreneurial class and strong-state mechanism.  Therefore, depending on 
the domestic dynamics, the mineral sector is suitable for generating linkage 
effects and knowledge spill-over. 
 
Over-regulation or the state-acquisition of the mineral resources refers to the 
public management of the minerals, state ownership of the means of 
production and the exclusion of private actors form the extraction and 
production activities.  The basic principle is that public enterprises are 
substitutes for the private firms with a view of achieving a number of 
development objectives. This kind of framework may occur for several 
reasons.  Firstly, state acquisition can arise in order to establish national 
sovereignty over mineral resources.  The country may desire to take control 
over its mineral deposits from foreign firms.  The logic of national economic 
independence leads to the expropriation of foreign firms that are exploiting 
mineral resources. The public sector taking control of production performs the 
guarantor role in terms of keeping the resource wealth in the domestic 
economy for the welfare of its citizens.  Secondly, the rationale behind 
nationalization of the resources can be rooted in state-managed development, 
which favors the use of public enterprises as engines of growth.  There is an 
implied assumption that the private sector prioritizes exploitation of the 
resources because it lacks the incentives to switch to higher value-added 
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production from primary commodity exports, but that states can channel 
resource export revenues to increase state income and undertake required 
investments to establish more advanced forms of production.  The over-
regulatory management is different from the transitory type of state 
participation, in that the interventions are intended to redress economic 
backwardness, the underdevelopment of domestic markets and the absence of 
a sufficiently competitive domestic entrepreneurial class.  Within the over-
regulatory framework, political leaders prefer the state and its bureaucracy to 
the market as the primary mechanism for allocating resources and investments.  
Private management is considered to lead to waste of a specific resource or all 
resources.   
 
Most of the questions about the success of the state-managed mineral 
production stem from the general problems of state-owned enterprises.  Public 
funds may be used for building public support instead of productive and 
development promoting investments. State enterprises may not be established 
merely for productivity and nationalist purposes, but may exhibit populist 
tendencies as well.  Apart from this, self-seeking politicians and bureaucrats 
may form coalitions to control resource management and seize the resource 
wealth according to their narrow interests. The appointment of the top 
managers can be carried out politically in turn making them vulnerable to 
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political influence and depriving them of the means and independence to 
operate effectively.  Corrupt behavior among the politicians and the state 
officials may prevent “wealth” from contributing to overall economic 
development when public companies become captured by politicians and 
officials rather than become a tool for implementation of the mineral policy.  
As well as corruption, appointment of personnel on non-merit-based criteria 
emerges as another problem related to the management performance of the 
enterprise.  As with the politically appointed top managers, recruitment 
processes for the lower officials would also reflect the influence of personal 
connections and political affiliations. The absence of competent administrators 
with the necessary understanding of economics and business operations and 
the absence of skilled and qualified employees weaken the performance of 
resource-based industry.  Apart from managerial problems, with the state as 
monopoly power in the resource industry, primary export revenues are more 
concentrated than in a competitive environment; therefore the state monopolist 
face weaker incentives for greater researches and investment in higher value-
added forms of production.  
 
Besides these problems, once established, over-regulatory management is 
resistant to corrective change since state-owned management is guaranteed its 
sphere of activity with institutional framework. Several reasons exist for this 
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institutional rigidity.  Firstly, high-ranking civil servants, in the state 
enterprise, are worried about reform since this could directly challenge their 
established positions and advantages.  For less personal reasons, civil servants 
may resist structural reformation since they regard reform attempts as a 
challenge directed at the state's capacity, because they consider themselves as 
extensions of the state, rather than as part of business-type entities.  Given the 
widespread agreement that the military and civil bureaucracies in most 
developing countries are the strongest and best-organized interest groups 
(Martinussen, 1997: 185), other social forces are less capable of ending state 
domination.  The prevailing resistance to change, identified with the over-
regulatory framework, reinforces the failures and shortages of institutional 
design.  Therefore once the mineral management is designed around public 
enterprise, it is difficult to modify the institutional design or move to 
alternative models due to the over-protected structure of the design and 
bureaucratic dynamics.  This characteristic is crucially important if the initial 
institutions are to be suitable for optimum utilization of the minerals in 
economic development and re-distribution of the mineral revenues. 
 
The problems related to the state-owned enterprises are not necessarily 
endemic to state-dominated mineral management.  It is important to note that 
the management in the over-regulatory framework need not be dysfunctional 
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management.  The shortages and risks associated with design can be identified 
at the initial stages of policy formation, or at the later stages, due to the 
improvement of overall institutional quality.  High level civil servants are not 
necessarily self-seeking and self-calculating.  An efficient system for 
appointing and rotating skilled labor without political interference and a 
sufficiently independent auditing mechanism for the financial performance of 
the enterprise can be incorporated into the institutional design.  That is to say, 
the problems discussed above are rectifiable flaws of the management that can 
be corrected by modern management methods and complementary 
institutional settings.  While these flaws are not necessarily overriding and can 
be ameliorated in interaction with general institutional quality, comprising the 
rule of law and effectiveness of the government, the negative side-effects of 
the design cannot be underestimated.  Even if the over-regulatory design is 
made consistent with an effective and functional management, it generates 
negative externalities for technological improvement which are inherent to the 
monopolistic model.  The alienation of multiple private actors from the 
industry can retard the national innovation that comes from competition 
dynamics. 
 
Concentration of mining activities under the state is more often detrimental to 
knowledge accumulation and technological development. Limiting the number 
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of the actors involved in production activities entails a decrease in the number 
of actors involved in knowledge accumulation, which militates against the 
notion of 'learning by doing',  since "the research sector uses human capital 
and the existing stock of knowledge to produce new knowledge" (Romer, 
1991: 79). National innovative or learning capacity is strengthened by the 
large number of actors involved in some kind of relation to the industry, 
whether it is in production of goods, supply of production inputs or 
transportation and research activities.   Wright argues that the United States' 
success in mining "was fundamentally a collective learning phenomenon" 
formed in intellectual networks linking world class mining universities and 
government and private research bodies (Wright, 1999: 308).  The alienation 
of the private sector from mineral processing especially also alienates it from 
the mineral science and production technologies; as Hirschman puts it, "an 
innovation in producing a given commodity could only be introduced by 
someone who has already engaged in its production by the old process" 
(Hirschman, 1958: 57).  Artificially created monopoly power, by denying the 
participation of alternative actors in the production, sustains anticompetitive 
forces and therefore undermines knowledge spill-over.  This side-effect 
created by state domination and an over-regulatory framework places an 
unduly burden on the state to conduct the necessary research on its own given 
the condition that other actors are excluded from national innovative capacity.  
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Therefore, within the over-regulatory framework, the state must consciously 
and strictly give importance to compensating for the deficiency that it creates. 
 
Comparison of different types of institutional arrangements for mineral 
management is largely based on their relative success or failure in achieving 
development objectives.  Adoption of the most suitable institutional setting 
requires a comprehensive understanding of international market forces and 
also the opportunities and risks associated with alternative regulations.  This 
does not imply that the creation of appropriate or improper institutions for the 
best use of minerals is purely an outcome of political will and action.  Mineral-
related institutions are established and developed in interaction with the 
country’s overall institutional capacity and within the domestic political 
economic context, both of which are products of historical process.  Still, the 
formation of the mineral management is also affected by the value of the 
mineral, which is determined by international political economy via export-
oriented activities; thereby mineral management partially becomes an outcome 
of the political will and action centered on the international value of the 
mineral.   
 
Comparing and contrasting the discussed managerial designs for resource use 
indicates different contexts in which the design is generated.  For insufficient 
 30 
regulation, fundamental ingredients of a stable and arbiter state capacity, 
which is essential to implement consistent mineral policies, do not exist.  The 
deficiency in institutional setting leads to arbitrary use of the minerals and 
inability to generate benefits for economic growth.  For the designs in which 
the state is the coordinator or sole producer, there exists a state capacity to 
establish purposive mineral policies.  Yet, the difference between these two 
lies in the act of the state in reserving production rights to the public sector or 
granting them to the private sector.  The effect of the political economic value 
of the mineral on its ownership and production structure is lay to this 
fundamental decision.  Retaining the evolution of the mineral industry within a 
particular country, the transition from commodity exports to higher value-
added products decreases national dependency on the international market for 
commodity exports; therefore this evolution override an attraction for state 
intervention.  On the occasions, when special restrictions for mineral exports 
are deemed necessary, enforcement is a temporary type of over-regulation, but 
evidently diverges from the broader over-regulatory institutional framework in 
terms of its temporality and basic preservation of private property rights. The 
main difference between the outcomes of two structures lies in their impact on 
technological progress and linkage stimulation.  This impact is constructive 
when the state is the coordinator, whereas it is potentially destructive when 
state domination is established.  The reason is that wider distribution of 
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production vitalizes research activities, while domination of production by a 
single actor captures but potentially stifles research activities.  This impact 
determines if resource industry can be used as a base for growth because 
technological progress is central to successful natural resource-based 
development. 
 
A historical view of resource-led development and why it has worked in some 
countries but not in others highlights the role of knowledge as a key to 
successful transition towards manufacturing and export diversification. 
Maloney argues that one of the fundamental factors behind the poor 
performance of Latin American resource-rich countries was deficient national 
learning or innovative capacity arising from low investment in human capital 
and scientific infrastructure (Lederman, Maloney, 2007: 18).  Wright and 
Czelusta examine the experiences of resource-led growth from a historical 
perspective, with a focus on mineral-rich countries and suggest that the 
linkages to the resource sector and complementary innovation were vital in the 
broader story of United States' economic success (Wright, Czelusta, 2002). For 
the cases of Sweden and Finland, the key to the success of resource-based 
sectors, according to Blomstörm and Kokko, lies in the continuous process of 
technological upgrading in an environment of knowledge clusters of 
universities, private think-tanks and within-firm research units. They 
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emphasize the role of domestic raw-material industries, such as timber and 
iron ore, in their development experiences by mentioning that, due to the 
knowledge accumulation, Sweden and Finland were able to upgrade the 
technological level of their resource industries and create a base for 
diversification with linkage effects by entering related activities such as 
engineering products, transport equipment, machinery and various types of 
services (Blomstörm and Kokko, 2002: 52).  These cases point to the role of 
the potentially high degree of complementarities between natural resources 
and knowledge for resource-based development.  Concerning the implications 
of institutional design, the success cases expose the importance of public 
policies which embrace investment in human capital and establish effective 
links between different sectors and various sources of research.   
 
Turkey's boron production is a convenient case-study for examining the 
factors which shape the legal and regulatory framework governing use of the 
mineral, how this framework interacts with mineral use within domestic and 
international markets, and consequently, how this institutional design 
determines the relative success or failure of the boron sector to contribute to 
domestic economic development.  The boron case of Turkey reveals that 
abundance of a mineral does not necessarily lead to correspondent revenues 
from its production and exports unless some distinctive value is added to the 
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products.  While Turkey possesses a significant share of the world boron 
reserves and accounts for one third of world boron production, its revenues 
from sales have never been significant.  In order to recognize this imbalance, 
the difference between highly processed boron products and lightly processed 
boron products is lay.  Still, a more comprehensive explanation, which 
accounts for this backwardness in technical skills and innovative capacity, is 
required to evaluate the appropriateness of the policy and the institutional 
design of boron management in respect to the established objectives and the 
expected profits.  At this point, the flaws of the institutional design and the 
negative externalities of the framework play the prevailing role.  Implications 
of boron management, after nationalization in 1978, are useful for testing the 
role of the institutions in mineral-based economic development.  By 1978, 
EtiBank, a state enterprise, was given the right to execute all mining of boron 
deposits and activities associated with those operations with the aim of 
bringing economic profits to domestic economy. Having mentioned that the 
over-regulatory institutional framework is designed to counter the feared 
exploitation of the subsoil, the main focus has evolved around elimination of 
private actors and building barriers to entry into the state's sphere of activity.  
At this juncture, 'goal displacement’ sets in "when rules, designed as means to 
ends, becomes ends in themselves"   as a dysfunction of state enterprises 
(Smith, 1988: 6).  The major motive behind state acquisition, originally being 
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to end the mere exploitation of subsoil wealth and to create a productive boron 
sector, evolved to exclude private actors not only from extraction but also 
from processing activities.  Since the main concentration has persisted in 
ownership and mineral rights issues, the state's domination, not necessarily in 
extraction, but in processing activities, has slowed the development of 
domestic expertise in boron production.  Dissociating the private actors from 
production and reducing the number of stakeholders to a single entity has 
practically confined the research activities and added-value generation under 
the state.   
 
The driving forces of economic nationalization, which incarnated in state-
domination and an over-regulatory framework for the utilization of boron 
deposits, can be analyzed in terms of external, economic and political 
inducements.  Beside these factors, which influence endogenous policy 
formation, the effect of 'mineral value' on the policy formation and institution 
building is straightforward in Turkey’s boron case.  As the mineral value 
represents the expected benefits and thereby prompts complementary 
measures the particular institutional framework attached to boron management 
reflects the specific value attached to the boron endowment in Turkey.  
Tracing a uni-directional causal linkage between the endogenous political 
economic forces and resource management would entail a state-led 
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monopolistic practice for all of the minerals extracted and produced in Turkey.  
While raw minerals production has had a heavy state presence, exploration 
and production of most industrial minerals other than boron is concentrated in 
the private sector in Turkey.  Privatization of chromium, aluminum, silver and 
copper mines and plants also indicates that broader institutional principles do 
not completely dominate the type of resource management.  If different 
management structures exist for different minerals within the same country, it 
becomes important to add "the mineral value" as an input for the policy 
formation and institutional framework. 
 
Other than Turkey being a suitable case to analyze how the over-regulatory 
framework is produced, it is also a suitable case to test how this framework 
affect the management and shape the utilization of boron deposits, and then 
how it offers contribution to domestic economy. While the framework is 
envisaged to create an engine for economic development, the negative 
externalities associated with the design are ample enough to forestall the 
achievement of established objectives.  Since the ability of a country to 
generate benefits from its resource base depends on the nature of the learning 
process involved (Stijns, 2002: 1), the state as the sole stakeholder in the boron 
sector has narrowed the country’s learning process within the capability of 
public enterprise.   
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Process-tracing is the chosen methodology to explore the casual links between 
the variables in this case study to present the sources and outcomes of an  
over-regulatory framework for resource management. As being one of the 
within-case methods of analysis, “process tracing focuses on whether the 
intervening variables between a hypothesized cause and observed effect move 
as predicted by the theories under investigation” (Sprinz and Nahmias, 2004: 
22).  By tracing the operation of casual mechanisms in Turkey’s boron case, 
the goal is to develop a continuous chain of paths establishing the linkage 
between boron endowment and its contribution to domestic economy.  The 
independent variables are selected as the value of the mineral and the 
economic, political and external factors.  The intervening variables are the 
institutional design of the mineral management and the utilization of mineral.  
The expected outcome, which is the dependent variable, is the success or 
failure in generating contributions to domestic economy.   
 
While an uninterrupted causal mechanism is aimed to be set forth through a 
step-by-step approach, Sprinz and Nahmias (2004: 24) indicates that “there are 
practical limits in our ability to observe or trace processes in all of their nearly 
infinite detail and to establish fully continuous sequences”.  In order to 
minimize these practical limits, the independent variables are explained 
separately as the mineral value, which implies the distribution of the deposits 
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and the usage areas, the external factors, which indicates the global political 
economy of the resource including the production and consumption patterns, 
the economic factors, which inhabit in resource economics; and finally the 
political factors, which shape the mode of production.  These independent 
variables together shape the institutional design of the mineral management, 
which is the intervening variable.   
 
In order to evade generalization, institutional design is divided into three 
classifications as insufficient regulation, state with a role of coordinator and 
over-regulation.  Following the institutional design, the second intervening 
variable is the utilization of the minerals. It is intervening because the 
institutional structure provides the means and limitations on utilization; in 
response, it leads to the dependent variable which is the contribution of 
mineral resources to domestic economy. 
 
According to Bennett and George (2005: 206-207) “process tracing forces the 
investigator to take equifinality into account, that is, to consider the alternative 
paths through which the outcome could have occurred”.  In order to overcome 
this pitfall, it is necessary to establish the particular weight of the independent 
and intervening variables through comparative case studies.  Since the scope 
of this study is limited to Turkey’s boron management, it was not possible to 
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test the impact of each variable at different cases. Since the operation of the 
variables is presented in accordance with the selected case, the practicability of 
the causal links is best suitable for over-regulatory framework for mineral 
management.   
 
Despite some shortcomings of process tracing, Checkel (2005: 22) suggests 
that “the signal benefit of process tracing is that, if done properly, it places 
theory and data in close proximity”.  With the purpose of testing how the 
resource endowment contributes to economic development, Turkey’s boron 
case is suitable to highlight the importance of which mechanisms determine 
the level of success or failure in generating contributions to domestic 
economy.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
FACTORS DRIVING TURKEY’S BORON POLICY 
 
 
Boron production in Turkey has been carried out by a state monopoly, 
Etibank, EtiHolding and EtiMine successively, following the nationalization 
of boron production in 1978.  Unlike the other state-owned economic 
enterprises, Eti was not designed to meet the domestic boron demand.  Indeed, 
the domestic boron consumption has been insignificant due to the 
characteristics of domestic industry. 
 
Turkey’s boron policy has been export-oriented both before and after 1978.  
With the nationalization, Turkey’s boron policy was designed to create an 
internationally competitive Turkish boron company, which conducts 
exploration, extraction, raw boron production, refined boron and compounds 
production,  marketing  and  sales as  a   single entity.   By increasing Turkey’s 
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share in the global boron market through a state-owned company, export 
revenues were originally expected to bring economic profits to domestic 
economy. 
 
 EtiMine establishes the general framework of Turkey’s boron policy as 
including the following goals: 
- to increase boron export revenues and contribute to the 
domestic economy, 
- to control the boron industry as a single entity, which is the 
state-owned Eti Mine, 
- to increase the export share of refined boron and special 
boron products at the expense of raw boron in the 
international boron market, 
- to widen the marketing network. 
 
The export-oriented and single-owner characteristics of the boron policy are 
driven by several factors.  The first factor is the mineral value.  The value 
associated with the importance of boron and the amount of reserves has 
generated a distinct stance about the management of boron deposits and 
production and about the profit expectations for the development of overall 
economy. The second factor is external forces.  The structure of the 
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international boron market, world boron consumption, trade trends, the 
strength and the influence of the world’s major boron producers contributed to 
the Turkey’s boron policy formation.  The third factors are economic.  In order 
to realize the most profitable returns from boron exports, the prior attention is 
given to commodity prices.  The elimination of domestic competitors would 
provide the state monopoly with the ability to control prices and, therefore, 
with more leverage in international market.  The gradual shift from raw boron 
exports to refined boron compounds and special boron products exports would 
necessitate huge investments, which would be carried out by the state.  Higher 
prices and value-added boron production would enable the country to convert 
its comparative advantage in boron deposits into economic profits. The fourth 
factor is the political approach.  The state-owned production is politically 
salient. The state possession of natural resources is argued to be the most 
convenient instrument to prevent foreign acquisition of the resources and to 
utilize the national resource riches for the development of the country. 
 
 
3.1. Mineral Value 
 
The term “mineral value” refers to the utility of the mineral for economic 
activities such as trade and industrial production. The potential of the mineral 
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deposits, which can be converted into economic profits by means of its useful 
function, gives value to a mineral.  The domestic and international usage of the 
mineral, the vitality of the mineral as an industrial input, strong anticipation 
for an increase in the importance of the mineral as a result of technological 
developments and promising research about the use of the mineral in critical 
sectors in the medium or long-term point out to what extent the mineral 
deposits within a country are valuable.  The value of the mineral deposits 
within the context of a national economy is assessed in terms of its abundance, 
quality, and production costs.   
 
The rational assessment of the mineral value is crucial to seek optimal profits 
from extraction, production, national use and export of the mineral.  
Determining mineral value entails appropriate measures and strategies to 
realize tangible profits.  Underestimation or unawareness of the value of the 
mineral deposits leaves the resources ineffectively exploited.  The lack of 
exploration activities, the absence of extraction and production technologies or 
the absence of sufficiently developed domestic economy may lead to this 
underestimation or the unawareness.  On the other hand, overestimating the 
mineral value brings about unattainable targets, even worse, it produces 
inadequate management.  If the tangible value does not correspond to the 
assessed value and so to attainable profits, the means for mineral utilization 
 43 
such as ownership structure and mineral policy would not result in optimal 
utility.   Cognitive elements are certainly included in optimistic assessments of 
the mineral value. Having large mineral deposits might generate an 
expectation for economic development just through possession of the reserves.  
At this point, an instant linkage between the natural endowment and economic 
development is considered to exist by the policy-makers.  Even if the mineral 
value is rationally assessed, and it points to high returns, converting the 
potential mineral value into real profits requires appropriate institutions and 
competent management.  Poor policy formation or implementation may 
prevent mineral utilization even if the mineral value implies high profit 
potential.   
 
 
3.1.1. Why do Turkey’s boron deposits have global importance? 
 
Boron minerals have an intensive and increasing usage in glass, ceramics, 
textile, detergent industry, in metallurgical, nuclear and agricultural 
applications, and in energy technologies.  Raw boron, refined boron and its 
special end products are used in more than 250 fields.  Boron is one of the 
main inputs into advanced industries and the annual world consumption of 
boron is 1.5 million tones.    
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The world boron reserves are estimated to be 885 billion tones.  The most 
important boron reserves in the world are located in Turkey, USA and Russia.  
Of the world boron reserves, %64 are in Turkey, %11 are in Russia and %9 
are in USA (Sapmaz, Gözen, Gözler, 2002).  Table II indicates the volume and 
geographical distribution of world boron reserves.  
 
 
Table II     World Boron Reserves (million tones, B2O3) 
 
 
Visible 
Economic 
Reserves 
Possible 
Reserves 
Total 
Reserves 
The Share 
In the 
Total 
Reserve 
(%) 
Reserve 
Life 
(years) 
Turkey 224.000 339.000 563.000 64 389 
USA 40.000 40.000 80.000 9 55 
Russia 40.000 60.000 100.000 11 69 
China 27.000 9.000 36.000 4 25 
Chile 8.000 33.000 41.000 5 28 
Bolivia 4.000 15.000 19.000 2 13 
Peru 4.000 18.000 22.000 2 15 
Argentina 2.000 7.000 9.000 1 6 
Kazakhstan 14.000 1.000 15.000 2 10 
TOTAL 363.000 522.000 885.000 100 610 
Source: Roskill, 2002.  
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Table II enables to make a comparison between the volume of boron reserves 
in Turkey and in other boron rich countries.  If the world boron consumption 
remains constant, Turkey can supply the world demand for nearly 400 years 
alone.  Moreover, the high tenor quality and mineral variety -tincal, ulexit and 
colemanit - of Turkey’s boron deposits is an important characteristic of its 
reserves.  The proximity of deposits to the surface enables open pit mining, 
which decreases production costs.  The usage of boron in various industries 
and Turkey’s abundant reserves with high tenor quality and low production 
cost comprise the value of the mineral for Turkey. For a more precise 
assessment of the potential boron value for Turkey, some further points are 
needed to be mentioned. 
 
Firstly, boron products are good substitutes for each other.  This 
substitutability makes their prices volatile.  Investments in specific kinds of 
compounds may not attract the present demand because of substitution effect.  
Besides, other minerals can substitute for borates as well.  “Borates in 
detergents can be replaced by chlorine bleach, phosphates can be used in 
enamels, and fiberglass can be substituted by long-chain carbon compounds.  
The use of boron for agricultural purposes is causing concern in some 
countries because of concentration in water cycle” (Cave, 2002: 271).  
Although boron compounds have intensive and increasing usage in various 
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industries, the substitution effect indicates that they are not indispensable 
inputs for some of the major boron consuming industries. 
 
Secondly, even if lightly processed boron compounds are not replaced with 
substitutes, Turkey’s gain from boron ore and refined boron exports would not 
be enough to create an impetus for overall economic development.  The boron 
abundance and low production costs of Turkey and existence of foreign boron 
consumers have enabled Turkey to acquire a share in the international boron 
market as the major raw boron exporter in the world.  Therefore, Turkey is 
giving importance to increasing its share of refined boron production and has 
been increasing its investments in developing refined products and boron 
compounds.  As the major exporter of boron ore, Turkey is obviously 
significant for boron processing industries in the world; however, Turkey has 
not developed distinct specialty in boron end products. While the current 
world market for boron ore and compounds totals $1.2 billion, abundant boron 
reserves cannot serve as an engine for economic development even if Turkey 
supplies this market by itself.  This is because the $80-90 billion of world 
transactions of advanced boron products comprise the most profitable boron 
sector.  Technology and know-how is the key determinant for the volume of 
the economic turnover in the special boron products sectors.  The use of boron 
in nuclear energy, the aircraft and space industry, in computer and mobile 
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phone batteries and in automobile energy cells highlights the importance of 
boron for advanced technologies and industries.  The quantity of the boron 
used in advanced boron products in the world is quite small, even less than 
Turkey’s annual boron production (Karakoç, 2004).  In order to derive 
economic gain from boron reserves and acquire a share in this bigger market, 
natural endowment is not sufficient. Specialization in boron end products 
requires an advanced domestic industry to generate demand.  The countries 
with the most developed chemical industries are not only the major producers 
of boron chemicals, but also they are the major consumers of boron products 
(Ertuğrul, 2004: 15).   
 
EtiBor’s 2003 Report points to the fact that Turkey has reached world 
standards in terms of boron mining and manufacturing basic commercial 
boron compounds, but not in special boron chemicals and advanced end 
products. Given the current sectors and quantities of world boron 
consumption, the value of Turkey’s boron deposits would be overestimated if 
boron richness is considered as sufficient to spur huge benefits for the 
country’s economy.  The optimistic approaches to Turkey’s boron, which 
suggest that economic value of the reserves is more than $1 trillion, disregard 
world consumption trends, overrate the deposits as a development asset by 
itself,  and finally lead to failure in capturing the crucial role of technology in 
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utilizing reserves for more advanced forms of production.  For such 
evaluations, possessing the largest reserves has obviously stimulated cognitive 
and emotional biases in the assessment of the mineral value. 
 
 
3.1.2. Increasing importance of boron in the global energy sector 
   
Considerations about energy security and greenhouse gas emissions have 
prompted research on alternative energy sources to fossil fuels.  Dependence 
on non-renewable energy sources and global warming trends necessitate novel 
and environmentally friendly energy sources in the medium and long term.  
Especially the developed countries, which depend on oil and natural gas 
imports, require substitutes to become self-reliant.  The concentration of oil in 
politically unstable areas necessitates diversification of energy resources.  To 
address energy security and environmental goals, hydrogen energy is a 
promising alternative.   
 
The increased use of hydrogen energy can create a large demand for boron 
chemicals.  Storing hydrogen to produce energy has the potential to generate 
strong demand for sodium boron hydride.   In the recent years, it has been 
sodium boron hydride that has appeared as a potential hydrogen carrier.  
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Chemical hydrogen storage –in particular through the use of sodium boron 
hydride is a way to combine high energy density and ease of hydrogen release. 
Reacting hydrides with water generates hydrogen.  Millennium Cell has 
developed systems utilizing sodium boron hydride to store hydrogen, which 
does not emit greenhouse gases.  To solve the problems related to hydrogen 
energy, such as storage, transportation and security, boron will have an 
increasing role in hydrogen economy.   
 
Major car companies such as General Motors, Honda and Toyota are investing 
for R&D to develop hydrogen vehicles. GM has announced plans to 
commercialize fuel-cell vehicles sometime between 2010 and 2020.  Fuel cell 
vehicles address one of the most important shortcomings of abundant and 
environmental energy sources such as solar power, and they are several times 
as efficient as gasoline-powered cars. General Motors carries out an 
encouraging research and investment for fuel cell vehicles.  GM plans to be 
the first manufacturer to sell one million fuel cell vehicles profitably.  GM has 
launched a test version of a fuel-cell-powered vehicle Chevy Sequel that burns 
no gas and produces no harmful emissions and has set a deadline of 2010 by 
which to develop a fuel-cell unit that is competitive in price and suitable for 
the mass market.  GM projects that by 2020, %10 of the world’s 90 million 
new cars and trucks will be powered by fuel cells. 
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Besides boron use in hydrogen-energy-powered systems, boron itself has been 
suggested as a promising motor fuel in the future (Demirbaş, 2005; Cowan, 
2001).  Boron fuel vehicles are zero-emission and are not flammable.  “Boron 
has a very high energy density, much better than that of liquid hydrogen” 
(Demirbaş, 2005).  Also, its use gives much safer combustion power than 
hydrogen.  Nevertheless, boron is a non-renewable resource, and the studies 
and investments on hydrogen power are far more advanced.  Cowan notes that 
the use of boron as a potentially mass-market fuel has not been demonstrated 
(2001: 1).  It’s more likely that the function of boron in the developing energy 
sector will be storing and transporting hydrogen.   
 
In order to switch to fuel cell vehicles, there are several technical and 
economic hurdles.  The initial costs of mass production, constructing refueling 
stations, making standardized codes and getting the combined support of 
government and energy companies make the hydrogen cars a post-2030 
technology at the earliest.  Nevertheless, the research on hydrogen energy is 
inspiring for an increase in boron demand.  Even before fuel-cell vehicles are 
launched, hydrogen batteries will be commercialized as the computer 
companies have recently concluded their researches.  Millennium Cell with 
Hydrogen on Demand has over 25 issued patents for hydrogen generation with 
boron hydride compounds.  The use of hydrogen energy in mobile-phone and 
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computer batteries has initiated the novel mass-consumption of an alternative 
energy source. Hydrogen energy, sustained with boron, will certainly create 
new areas of demand for special boron compounds and contribute to the 
higher valuation of the mineral for the energy industry.  Yet, Scientific 
American argues that even if all cars in the US are fueled by hydrogen cells, 
boron consumption in the field would be less than %5 of US boron production.  
Since the know-how of the production of special boron compounds for 
hydrogen energy generates the value for boron, even if the demand for boron 
dramatically increases, the owners of the hydrogen energy technologies will be 
the ones who produce valuable boron products.   
 
 
3.2. External Factors 
   
The structure of the international market of a mineral has implications for the 
producers in terms of setting the standards to produce for maximum utility.  
The challenges and benefits of the existing and foreseeable world market of a 
specific mineral shape the production and marketing strategies of individual 
producers. External factors are simply the dynamics and features of the world 
mineral market. These dynamics are determined by production and 
consumption trends, which imply supply and demand patterns.  The number of 
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the producers signifies intensity of the competition and the structure of supply 
in the mineral market.  If the market is limited to a few producers, they can 
control supply and the prices.  If there are multiple producers in the market, 
competition among them leads to a decrease in prices and eliminates relatively 
inefficient and high cost producers.   
 
Equilibrium prices are achieved by market forces provided that the supply and 
demand match in the world market.  If the world supply is less than demand, 
prices in the international market would go up and favor the producers.  When 
supply is potentially larger than the actual demand, as in boron market, market 
forces may pull the commodity prices downwards, as multiple producers enter 
into the market and compete by pricing tactics.  Due to such market forces, 
concentration of production in few producers, which is an oligopoly, enable 
them to control both supply and the prices. Apart from the production side of 
the world market, consumption trend is a determining external factor on the 
mineral policy.  Annual increases in consumption or a regular decline due to 
substitutes or environmental concerns, compel the producer to develop plans 
for the foreseeable future. Product diversification and product quality are two 
more of the requirements of the demand side in an international market.  
Products in question should at least match the existing standards of substantial 
alternative products 
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Geographical location of major consumers also poses a challenge or 
opportunity for producers.  Relatively high transportation costs make it more 
difficult for some producers to be influential in every consuming region, 
unless their products are purchased for their specialty and high added-value. 
 
 
3.2.1. Structure of the world boron market and industry 
   
World boron market is different from regular minerals and metals market.  
Borates are not traded as commodities. “There is not a trading centre for 
borates in say London or New York and prices are negotiated individually 
between buyers and sellers” (Cave, 2002: 28).  The feature shaping the borate 
market is that the supply and demand curves are less effective on the 
equilibrium price for boron than on other mineral commodities. Boron demand 
is relatively price inelastic due to the consumption patterns and the 
concentration of supply in a few producers.   
 
Before the nationalization of Turkish boron mines, US Borax was the biggest 
producer in the world.  The development of marketing, technological and 
organizational skills due to the long history of US boron production combined 
with abundant reserves enabled US Borax to establish dominance in the world 
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boron market.  With such an advantage and influence in the market, the US 
has had leverage in determining and controlling the prices. 
 
One of the external factors that had driven and still drives Turkey’s boron 
policy is the fact that the international boron market with few producers can 
sustain high and stable prices and maximize export revenues for those 
producers.  With the nationalization of boron production in Turkey, the 
international boron market has been a highly concentrated oligopoly; even it is 
called a duopoly (Cave, 2002).  In such a market, the biggest two producers 
can maintain higher prices more easily than multiple producers.  It’s also in 
their interest to perform this way given that the US reserves are in the latter 
stage of their lifecycle and Turkey’s boron reserves depend on raw or lightly 
processed exports. 
 
World boron market is described as an oligopoly since seventy-five percent of 
the market is controlled by Rio Tinto Borax with its mine at Boron in 
California and Etimine based in Turkey. Of world boron production, %25 is 
realized by smaller suppliers. World production of boron minerals is displayed 
in Table III. 
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Table III      Production of boron minerals by country 
Country   Company     Production (2001) 
USA    US Borax                1.300.000 
    Ford Cady          B2O3      650.000 
    IMC Chemical 
    ABC 
Turkey       Etimine  1.476.000
  
               B2O3      517.000 
Chile       Quiborax                                   340.000 
___               B2O3      119.000 
Peru    JSC Inkabor                             9.000 
Argentina   Borax Argentina             360.000 
    Processora de Boratos Argentinos         B2O3      61.000 
    Ulex SA  
Bolivia   Compania Minera Tierra Ltd.SA                                    35.000 
    Corban SA 
Russia   JSC Energomash-JSC Bor                        700.000 
                            B2O3       60.000 
Kazakhstan   JSC Inderbor                                      
115.000 
                  B2O3     12.000 
China      State Corporations                         314.000 
                  B2O3   110.000 
Other                                  5.000 
                              B2O3     17.000 
Total                            4.654.000 
Source:  Roskill, 2002                                                                                B2O3      1.546.000 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from the US and Turkey, Russia is the most significant country in terms 
of its reserves and potential production among the other suppliers of boron.  
Due to the geographical location of its deposits, the Joint Stock Company Bor 
is an export-oriented enterprise.  Its basic consumers are the countries of 
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Asian-Pacific region (China, Japan, republic of Korea) while %15-25 of its 
production is delivered to the home market.  The geographical location of 
boron deposits is the most important factor determining the identity of 
Russia’s consumers because transportation cost is a disadvantage for Russia in 
terms of diversifying its markets towards West. 
 
Argentina is one of the two leading boron producers in South America.  Two 
multinational companies carry out boron production in the country.  Borax 
Argentina SA, which is the biggest producer in country, is a subsidiary of Rio 
Tinto.  The other producer Processora de Boratos Argentinos is owned by 
Ferro Corp. and Canadian JEM Resources& Engineering Inc. 
 
On the consumption side of the world boron market, there occurs rather 
slightly shifts in demand and there exists a few sizeable customers, who 
comprise most of the business.  Of the refined boron products, %45 is 
consumed in Europe, %25 in US, %11 in Asia and %1.6 by Asia and Middle 
East.  Apart from the environmental concerns and availability of substitutes 
for boron, the intensity of boron consumption is closely related to 
industrialization. Boron consuming sectors and regions are shown in Table IV. 
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Table IV  World boron consumption by sectors and regions (thousand tones)   
 
      America 
North/South 
   Europe 
West/East 
Asia Africa/ 
Middle 
East 
Total Share 
Insulation-
grade  glass 
fibers 
 180   /      5 100  /  5 10 - 300 20 
Textile-grade 
glass fibers   80    /     20 75   / 10 40 - 225 15 
Borosilicate 
glasses   25    /    10 70   /  5 10 - 120 8 
Ceramics, 
glass  15     /    30 80   / 20 45 5 195 13 
Agriculture  15     /   10 35   /  5 5 5 75 5 
Detergents and 
soap  25     /     - 185  / 10 20 - 240 16 
Other  35     /    75 140  / 45 35 15 345 23 
                  
Total 375   /    150 685  / 100 165 25 1500 100 
    Share % 25                 10 
45.65       
6.75 11 1.6 100 
 
 
Source: Roskill, 2002. 
 
 
Since borates are not traded as regular mineral commodities and supply and 
demand curves are not the dominating element in pricing boron, development 
of marketing skills is a critical factor for in reaching the customers.  Price 
stability, continuous supply, product quality and effective distribution 
channels emerge as factors differentiating the producers from each other. 
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Firstly, ownership disputes over boron mines and production within a country 
negatively affect the customer’s requirement for stability of supply.  Since 
boron demand doesn’t reveal major shifts, guarantee of a continuous supply is 
important for establishing and maintaining long-term customer relations.  
Secondly, product quality developed with production knowledge and 
technological advancements is essential to catching the attention of customers.  
Given the fact that major boron customers are developed and industrialized 
countries, improvement in product quality, diversification of products and 
sustained customer support for specialty products are necessary for flourishing 
in the world boron market.  Thirdly, developing strong marketing networks 
through distribution channels and sales agents in consumer countries is equally 
important. As US Borax notes “list prices are established annually with 
standard quantity discounts for large users” (Marcus, 1997), so the 
development of long-term business relations significantly influence the world 
boron market. 
 
 
3.2.2. US Borax, the world giant boron producer 
 
US Borax, Inc is a wholly owned subsidiary of London, United Kingdom-
based Rio Tinto plc, which is one of the world’s largest mining and metal 
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companies.  Rio Tinto produces non-ferrous metals, platinum group metals, 
coal, oil and gas, steel and stainless steel.  Rio Tinto is among the world’s 
main producers of coal and one of the major producers of coking coal for the 
world market.  US Borax is the leading producer of refined boron in the world, 
with its main mine in Boron, California.  Of the world production, the share of 
US Borax is around %40.  Of the world revenues on boron sales, the 
company’s share is around %70. 
 
Boron mining in US started in 1872 with Smith Brothers Borax Co.  The 
company’s name has evolved several times and since 1993 it has been called 
US Borax, Inc.  US borax is one of the United State’s longest surviving 
mining firms, which celebrated 125th anniversary of continuous business in 
1997. 
 
Besides its rich boron deposits and long experience in the world boron market, 
rapidly growing domestic industries have enabled US Borax to develop its 
production base.  In 2005, about one half of domestic production was 
consumed within the US (Lyday, 2006).  With a high domestic demand for 
boron products, it’s an advantage for the company to interact with different 
sectors which develop specialty products. 
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Being the oldest boron producer in the current world market, US has 
developed its production technology, product diversification, distribution 
channels and marketing network.  US Borax supplies to agricultural, industrial 
and specialty customers in more than 80 countries through international 
distribution centers (Marcus, 1997).  The company has shipping facilities and 
international distribution centers in the Netherlands, France, Spain and 
Belgium.  US Borax also has secondary storage points in Austria, Germany, 
Norway, the republic of Korea, Taiwan and Ukraine (Lyday, 2004).  A 
worldwide network of sales representatives and agents facilitate the 
sophisticated distribution system.  US Borax has more than 200 nation-wide 
distribution offices.  Around the world, it has 4 regional offices, 20 sales 
offices, and distribution and sales agencies in 52 countries (Üncü and 
Yerlikayalar, 2004).  Such a strong distribution and marketing network 
enables US Borax to maintain and develop its business relations, thus 
becoming the dominant boron supplier in the world. 
 
Apart from the marketing skills and abilities, US Borax is the most effective 
boron producer in terms of its product range, special products for sector-
specific markets, R&D efforts, ISO 9001 and 14001 certificates and service 
supply. The linkages between the boron industry and other domestic industries 
have certainly stimulated innovation and production knowledge. US industry 
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also produces boron minerals with a higher productivity per worker hour than 
those produced in other countries (Lyday, 2004). 
 Existence of such a powerful competitor in the market has affected Turkey’s 
boron policy formulation on the grounds that boron production and 
management, including the extraction, production, distribution, marketing of 
boron products and adequate investment for high-value products, ought to be 
operated in one hand in order to make Turkey’s boron products competitive in 
the world market.  According to the Etimine officials, numerous private 
producers would not be able to compete with US Borax. Therefore Turkey’s 
boron policy under single-producer control reflects apprehension about the 
magnitude and weight of US Borax in the international boron market. 
 
  
3.3.Economic factors 
 
The dynamics of natural resource economics affect the formation and changes 
of mineral policies and institutional design of mineral management.  Mineral 
deposits to generate wealth and spur economic growth can be utilized through 
exploitation of minerals for domestic industrial development and/or through 
export revenues, which strengthen the balance of payments. 
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Exploiting the mineral deposits as a platform for domestic industrial 
development, like the United States, Canada and Australia depends on the 
structure and course of the learning process of mineral management.  
According to Wright (1990), if natural resources are developed through 
advanced forms of knowledge development, their spill-over effects may be 
just as powerful as in any other high-value added sector.  Mining industry has 
the potential to generate multiple spill-over effects at the local and national 
level.  The linkages between mining and other industries, which consume 
mineral products or supply goods and services to mineral processing 
industries, maximize the potential and economic value of mineral-based 
industrialization.  Utilization of mineral deposits as an impetus to domestic 
industrial development via multiple linkages to domestic industrial and service 
sector occurs through knowledge development and creation of social and 
human capital.   
 
Developing and using mineral deposits as a platform for broader industrial 
development is a longer term policy than generating revenues from raw or 
lightly processed mineral exports. The comparative advantage in the 
abundance and quality of a mineral, low exploration, extraction and processing 
costs and geographical proximity to international consumers may encourage 
domestic actors to give priority to non-processed mineral exports, because 
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these advantages make the mineral production a profitable business even 
without large capital investments and R&D expenditures. 
The intensity of raw mineral exports makes the revenues vulnerable to 
commodity price fluctuations and declining terms of trade.  Commodity prices 
fluctuate more than that of manufactured goods.  Boom and bust cycles 
destabilize export revenues and hamper long-term economic forecasts and 
investments.  Therefore the fluctuations in resource prices hinder stable 
economic growth if the intensity of raw mineral exports is greater than 
processed product exports.  Declining terms of trade is another economic 
challenge for raw commodity exporters. A large trade imbalance in the 
economic exchange of raw or lightly-processed minerals for high value-added 
products worsen the national balance-of-payments position.  Therefore a short-
sighted wealth generation through a focus on unprocessed mineral exports 
does not confer long-term prosperity based on mineral wealth; moreover it 
may lead to escalating internal conflict. The economic benefits associated with 
mineral endowments and the challenges of realizing these benefits affect the 
formation of mineral policies.  Policy-makers develop institutional 
arrangements in order to maximize the benefits that they seek and to manage 
the challenges of mineral-led economic growth. Broader policies focused on 
industrial development and export revenues differ according to their tools of 
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regulation, methods for eliminating the obstacles, and timeframe for achieving 
defined objectives and terms of success. 
 
Institutional design of mineral management is constructed in order to realize 
the expected economic benefits and reduce the challenges of mineral 
economics.  For Turkey, its comparative advantage in boron deposits has been 
a central motivation for state acquisition of reserves for extraction and 
production purposes.  Export revenues have been defined by the policy-makers 
as the means of realizing economic benefits from its comparative advantage in 
boron.  Export-focused boron production and management has brought with 
greater recognition of possible challenges of mineral economics.  Export-
concentrated boron policy, eliminating the effects of commodity price 
fluctuations and declining terms of trade together form the economic bases of 
Turkey’s boron policy and thus the institutional design of boron management.   
 
 
3.3.1. Comparative advantage 
 
Turkey’s comparative advantage in boron abundance has been central to 
nationalization of reserves. First and foremost, Turkey is in the early stages of 
its boron mine lifecycle and it’s estimated that boron deposits in Turkey can 
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meet the world demand for 400 years, boron-processing companies and 
industries can develop their investment and production plans according to the 
availability of boron in Turkey.  The capability of Turkish reserves to supply 
boron for centuries encourages not only capital investment for boron products, 
but also R&D activities to extend boron use in new technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Secondly, boron mines in Turkey are cheaper to operate than in other 
countries.  While mining operations in Turkey are either underground or open 
cast, US Borax’s open pit mine in Boron is already 750 meters deep (Cave, 
2002).  Turkey’s reserves being close to the surface make the extraction less 
capital intensive and less costly.  As the reserves in US remains deeper, US 
Borax has to invest in new equipment and its production cost increases. 
Figure II     Mine(s) Lifecycle 
 
Source: Cave, 2002. 
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Thirdly, the tenor content of Turkey’s boron is higher than other boron-rich 
countries.  High tenor content makes it less costly to produce refined boron, 
such as borax and boric acid, with Turkish boron.  Even more importantly, raw 
Turkish boron is used by some branches of business as an input without any 
processing due to high tenor content , while boron ore of other countries is 
needed to be processed more in order to reach the same tenor content as 
Turkey’s. 
   
Finally, the geographical location of Turkey’s boron reserves reduces 
transportation costs.  Proximity to Europe, which consumes approximately 1/3 
of world boron, allows Turkey to increase its market share at the expense of 
US Borax.  JSC Bor in Russia has significant reserves and potential production 
capacity, but the most serious obstacle is transportation costs.  Boron mines in 
Russia are far away from major markets and the nearest port to mine is 
unsuitable for ships other than small coasters. 
 
The quantity and quality of its mines, low extraction, production and 
transportation costs create comparative advantage for Turkey in the area of 
boron.  These fixed advantages make boron extraction profitable without the 
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need for huge capital investment and innovative technology; this is why these 
advantages also pose a threat for development of boron industry in Turkey. 
   
 
3.3.2. Commodity price fluctuations 
 
One of the economic rationales behind nationalization was to preserve high 
and stable commodity prices for boron mineral. Before nationalization, low 
production costs related to the comparative advantage of Turkey enabled the 
entry of multiple domestic and foreign private producers into the market in the 
country.  The existence of many producers in the market led to a cut-throat 
competition, as a result boron prices and the export revenues declined during 
the 1970s. Given the absence of a domestic-boron consuming industry, policy-
makers recognized that export revenues would be the most profitable and rapid 
way to generate welfare from boron abundance.  Declining price was the 
biggest challenge for increasing export revenues.  In 1974, the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources set a minimum desired price of boron at $70/ 
ton, a more than two-fold increase, from $30/ ton.  In the competitive boron 
market, however it was not possible for the state to increase prices to higher 
levels (Karakoç, 2004).  Consequently, the severe decline in boron prices 
ended up with the nationalization of boron production. 
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3.3.3. Declining terms of trade 
 
Declining terms of trade thesis, established by Singer (1950) and Prebisch 
(1950) anticipates a deterioration of the ratio of the prices between primary 
commodities and manufactured goods to the disadvantage of the prior. Based 
on the income elasticity of demand, which is suggested to be higher for 
manufactured goods than for commodities, terms of trade for primary 
commodity exports have a tendency to decline over time. Furthermore, 
according to declining terms of trade, “the producers of industrial goods have 
market power and they can capture the benefits of higher productivity in the 
form of higher incomes, while the producers of primary commodities 
generally take their prices as given” (Mollick, et al, 2007: 685).   
 
Declining terms of trade relate to Turkey’s boron policy in two different 
aspects.  Firstly, an increase in the raw boron prices is not expected compared 
to the rise in processed boron prices. If production is purely left to domestic 
market dynamics, as it was prior to nationalization, it is not practical to control 
and lift the raw boron prices up, while any shortage in international boron 
market is not foreseen with the world reserves, which are estimated to meet 
the  current boron demand for more than 600 years.  Therefore capturing the 
whole production would lead to an increase in state company Eti’s income 
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while the revenues are not expected to increase in response to raw boron prices 
in the short or long term. Secondly, as a remedy to declining terms of trade, 
developing countries are suggested to diversify into manufactured exports.  
Having a well-established political economic tradition in line with state 
enterprises, at least rhetorically, state enterprise is viewed as a vehicle to 
undertake capital-intensive projects to realize investments for diversifying 
towards processed boron products.  
 
 
 3.4. Political Factors 
 
The type of the political regime, structure of the state institutions and socio-
political position of the citizens has a direct effect on the institutional design of 
natural resource management.  Many cross-country studies have assessed the 
relation between the political systems and resource use.  Democratic and 
authoritarian political regimes present the main contrasts in terms of how they 
organize the ownership structure of the resources and how they establish the 
legal and regulatory framework for resource production and management. 
 
The role of the state as owner and producer of rentable resources, or the role of 
the state as regulator and coordinator, is created according to the impact of 
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political tradition on the organization of the economy and vice versa.  In 
democratic regimes, political institutions generally serve to organize and 
regulate market economy.  Therefore, the private sector engages in production, 
while the state acts to regulate.  The   dynamic   relationship   between   the   
market economy  and  liberal     political institutions further limits the function 
of the state in the economic sphere.  The mutual interaction of political and 
economic organization does not locate one above the other. 
 
In authoritarian regimes, the state dominates economic organization.  In order 
to consolidate its position through resource wealth, an unrepresentative state 
claims ownership to rentable resources.  Given the fact that the political 
institutions and the economic activities are subordinated to the ruler and the 
rule of law is not entrenched, resource wealth is likely to lead to benefits for 
political elites, rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and even violence to obtain 
the ownership of resources. 
 
The evolution of the political regimes in developing countries makes it 
difficult to precisely fit their institutional design of resource management to 
any of above groups.  A wide range of political systems, such as transitional 
democracies, unstable democracies with a legacy of authoritarian rule, stable 
authoritarian governments, unstable and unrepresentative authoritarian 
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regimes, have their own political dynamics and traditions.  Due to the 
individual characteristics and evolution of political systems, diverse regulatory 
approaches on mineral management have evolved over time.   
 
The political tradition within a country determines the acceptability of state-
owned companies and the extent of state influence on specific economic 
sectors.  The flourishing private sector in mineral production may make state 
production unnecessary or undesirable according to the improvement of liberal 
institutions and changing perceptions of ruler and citizens about the proper 
role of the state in the economy.  Yet, the long experience of state-owned 
companies enlarges state influence within the political system through the 
development of bureaucratic capabilities and socio-economic relations with 
their employees.  Once the political system allows state-owned enterprises, 
their large role in national political economy becomes difficult to change even 
if the country is otherwise developing liberal democracy.  Attempts to change 
the long tradition of state companies are usually perceived by at least some 
influential elites to be rent-distribution to other actors and a lost of power by 
the state. 
 
The tradition of state-owned companies can also lead the state into new sectors 
or new resources.  If natural resources generate significant rents, the familiar 
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process of state acquisition can block the entry of private producers from the 
sector and bring resource wealth under state control.  Deficient characteristics  
of the political system, such as poor definition of property rights over 
resources and weak legal regulation, lead to easy acquisition of the resource by 
the state.   
 
 
3.4.1. The role of the state in Turkey’s domestic mining sector  
 
Mining industry in Turkey was established by the state for the purposes of 
industrialization and economic development.  As mining is very capital 
intensive, state investments were required to initiate the sector.  In 1935, The 
Mineral Research and Exploration Institute (MTA) was established along with 
the Etibank to develop a domestic mining industry.  Prior to the mid 1990s, 
public sector funding represented about %80 of total investment in mining 
sector in Turkey and the investments had been undertaken by MTA and 
through Etibank. 
 
Divestment of companies in the mineral sector (primarily cement companies) 
was most noticeable in 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1996.  Especially after the mid 
1990s, relations with the European Union and the foundation of the Turkish 
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Privatization Administration motivated further privatizations and review of 
state-owned enterprises.  In 1998, Etibank was restructured as Eti Holding 
A.Ş. with the co- partnerships of Eti Boron A.Ş., Eti Aluminum A.Ş., Eti 
Chromium A.Ş., Eti Copper A.Ş., Eti Silver A.Ş., Eti Electrometallurgical 
A.Ş. and Eti Marketing and Foreign Trade A.Ş.  In 2000, Eti Copper, 
Chromium, Electrometallurgical and Silver A.Ş. were transferred to the 
Privatization Administration.  In 2004, Eti Aluminum was transferred to the 
Privatization Administration as well.  In 2004, the state-owned Eti Holding 
A.Ş. was restructured and named as Etimine General Directorate.  The co-
partnership regulation of Eti Boron A.Ş. was revoked and boron extraction and 
production became the main field of activity for Etimine.  With the 
privatization of the mentioned enterprises in 2004, privatization of mineral 
sector organizations resumed at a brisk pace (Mobbs, 2004).  The state’s 
weight in the mining sector has started to decrease except for boron 
production.  The private sector has started to dominate the industrial minerals 
production. 
 
The most important factor that paved the way for privatization of mining 
enterprises was the state’s inability to realize profits.  Mining has contributed 
around %2 to Turkey’s GDP in the past few decades.  The annual growth rate 
of mining has lagged behind manufacturing and the overall Turkish economy.  
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The share of mineral exports has also been small in comparison to agricultural 
and industrial exports.  Between 1983 and 2001, the average shares of 
agricultural, mineral and industrial exports within the entire export volume are 
15.%9, %2.2 and %81.7 respectively (Yılmaz and Arıoğlu, 2003). 
 
The burden of the state-owned-enterprises on the state budget had negatively 
affected the political perception about state power and its function in the 
domestic mining sector.  Yet, even with the evolution of political institutions 
and traditions, which has led to privatization of other minerals, revision of 
mineral policies has not involved production of boron minerals.  The long-
lasting experience of state-owned-enterprises is still a factor supporting state 
ownership if the ownership returns profits.  Therefore, the decreasing role of 
the state in general mining industry is not valid for the boron mining and 
production.  The anticipated profitability of boron mining is keeping the 
extraction and production activities under the state domain through Etimine.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF 
 BORON PRODUCTION IN TURKEY 
 
 
4.1. Private enterprises until 1978 
 
 
Boron production in Turkey started with foreign entrepreneurship at late 19th 
century.  After the foundation of Turkish Republic, the country’s insufficiency 
to realize and assess the value of economic resources was also reflected in the 
mining industry.  Combined with the negative impacts of the First World War, 
the Great Depression and the Second World War on the world economy and 
on the production capacities, boron production in Turkey has been 
insignificant and foreign enterprises driven until the end of Second World 
War.   
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After the 1950s, domestic boron enterprises have started to flourish in Turkey 
besides foreign companies.  Yakal Borasit Ltd., Şayakçı Mining, Rasihsan 
Mining Ltd., Mortaş and Bortaş were the domestic private boron producing 
companies which were established in this period.  Etibank, the state-owned 
company, has started boron production after the first domestic private 
companies.  US Borax continued boron production with its subsidiary Borax 
Consolidated Ltd. and successively with Turk Boraks Mining. A partnership 
was established with US Borax and a domestic company Garanti Bank A.Ş. 
under the title of Garanti Trade A.Ş.  Besides to these companies, American 
Potash& Chemical Corp., a rival of US Borax,  established a subsidiary in 
Turkey with the name of Kemad A.Ş. in 1962 (Çetin, 2005: 59).  
 
During the period between 1950s and 1978, until boron production was 
nationalized, the picture of boron producers in Turkey appears quite 
diversified in terms of ownership structures and trade relations. In an 
environment of newly developing boron sector, mining fields were sometimes 
being handed over between companies (Buhler, 1996).  Despite the initial 
deficiencies of domestic private and state enterprises due to the lack of 
experience, technical knowledge and know-how, boron production in Turkey 
has improved in a short-time thanks to the high-tenor quality of boron ores,low 
extraction costs and geographical proximity to Europe.  Following the entry of 
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multiple actors, competition dynamics has led to a decrease in the boron prices 
in the newly developing boron sector in Turkey.  At the beginning of 1970s, 
some of the domestic enterprises reached a capacity to process boron and 
increased their market share in Europe significantly (Buhler, 1996).  First 
boron products factory was established by a domestic private enterprise and 
this was followed by Etibank (Çetin, 2005: 69).  While boron production in 
Turkey started to shift towards processed products besides ore extraction, 
especially with the driving force of domestic private enterprises, the suspicion 
about US Borax ownership of boron mines and falling boron prices prepared 
an atmosphere for nationalization of boron production.  Partnerships between 
domestic producers and foreign companies, sharp decline in boron prices and 
the changes in the owners of mines seemed like shady business and 
exploitation of Turkish boron by external forces.  As a remedial measure, 
cancellation of mining licenses and seizure of all mining equipment and means 
that belonged to private enterprises has brought with the full state control over 
boron mines.  What is more noteworthy is that the wave of nationalization 
went further to cut the boron ore supplies by the state-owned enterprise 
Etimine to domestic boron manufacturers.  
 
Probably not dissociating private actors from extraction activities, but rather 
alienating them from processing operations has slowed the evolution of boron 
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sector in Turkey a result of loosing competition dynamics, waste of private 
sector’s experience accumulated until then, and private sector dynamism for 
business operations. Table V shows private refined boron producers in Turkey 
with their production capacities and closure dates. 
 
 
 
Table V    Refined boron producers in Turkey 
Company name  Borax  Boric acid Perborate
 Closure date 
Göknur Kimya  15.000  3.000        1984 
Kimsan   24.000  6.000        1983 
Atabay İlaç       5.000      
1984 
Murat Kimya     5.000        
1990 
İnterkim   5.000          
1993 
Alev Maden   2.500          
1993 
Bor Ltd.   5.000          
1997 
Private Sector Total  51.500  14.000  5.000 
EtiMine Total  55.000  20.000         1986 
Source: Çetin, 2005. 
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4.2. The legal framework of nationalization 
 
In 1978, the government passed Mines Expropriation Law No.2172 which 
authorized the expropriation of private mines deemed essential to the state and 
cancelled all mining permission to private companies by giving all mining 
rights to Etibank. With this law, all the activities related to boron comprising 
exploration, production and marketing are put in possession of state-owned 
enterprise Etibank.  Also the law established a restriction to transfer of 
competence or privilege over boron mines from Etibank to real persons or 
legal entities.  In 1983 the Parliament passed another Law No.2840, which 
replaced the previous Law No. 2172 by re-stressing the emphasis on boron 
production by state monopoly.  In 1985, the Parliament made an amendment 
to the Mining Law by widening the extent of state monopoly for trona and 
asphaltite besides boron mines.  In 1994, another amendment to the Law was 
established in order to transfer the exploration and production of trona and 
asphaltite to private sector; while adjudicated that the state possesses the sole 
right to mine and operate boron salt, uranium and thorium. 
 
The legal framework over boron production has aimed to establish a full state 
control over the boron resources.  Although the law was amended two times in 
order to regulate or change the ownership status of other minerals which are 
 80 
included with the law, mining rights of boron has not changed with the 
amendments. Dissociating private sector from boron production in a sharp 
manner while leaving production of trona and asphaltite to private sector 
exposes the specific value attached to boron minerals.  The difference in the 
regulatory approach to boron and other minerals minifies the impact of the 
state’s settled institutional approach on mineral governing attitude. On the 
contrary, this difference reveals that the value of boron has determined the 
scope of the legal framework.  
 
 
4.2.1. Policy instruments of Eti and its outcomes 
 
After the nationalization, with the purpose of developing its position in the 
global boron market, Eti has employed specific instruments, which fall into 
two categories. The first set of instruments is directed on domestic producers 
and generally has taken the shape of supply cuts, irregular supplies and 
unfavorable prices. These instruments derive its incentives from monopolistic 
attitude, and find basis in the supportive political power and complementary 
legal setting; as a result gradually expose an expansive trend in Eti’s domestic 
scope of competence.  The second set of instruments is employed to increase 
Eti’s own capacity such as investments to increase production capacity, 
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institutional re-structuring, marketing and R&D activities to diversify and 
advance product range.  These instruments derive its incentives from business 
expansion. Since the second set of instruments is among the basic strategies of 
a company whether it is private or state-owned, and not limited to the 
protective attempts of a state monopoly, they will be presented in Chapter IV. 
 
The first set of instruments, which include supply cuts, irregular or low-grade 
supplies and unfavorable prices, were not expressed as a part of official policy, 
but gradually have become a part of policy implementation. The law 
establishing the legal basis for state-ownership has cancelled all private 
mining licenses and referred mining and production rights to state monopoly 
Eti.  However the private producers, which continued its production with 
refined and processed boron products were exposed to the mentioned set of 
restrictive instruments in the course of time.   
 
There are several reasons for the expansive trend in the implications of Eti’s 
sphere of monopoly.  As Eti started to make investments in refined boron 
products and diversify its products, private producers whose production is 
potentially competitor to that of Eti have been exposed to irregular supplies, 
low-grade raw boron or unfavorable prices compared to their foreign 
counterparts.   Atabay firm is one of the examples of the local boron producers 
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which had to end its production as a result of the price policy and irregular 
supplies of Eti.  In 1970s, Atabay firm has started its production of perborate, 
which is a refined boron product,  with a capacity of 5000 tons per year; and in 
a short while, has come to meet domestic perborate demand in Turkey.  Eti 
supplied the firm with boron ore at a price of $250 per ton while foreign firms 
were supplied at a price of $120-140/ ton.  At the same time, Eti has started to 
produce perborates after it has contracted with a French company to install a 
perborate facility in Turkey. As the Atabay firm has become a competitor to 
Eti’s perborates, low quality and irregular ore supplies to Atabay besides to the 
unfavorable sale prices had led to the closure of the firm in 1984 (Önür, 2002).  
In response to the questions about the differences in price settings, the 
interpretation of Eti is quite noteworthy.  A former high official of Eti explains 
the price settings in favor of international competition dynamics.  According 
to his explanation, when foreign firms buy Eti’s boron, their payment to Eti at 
a price of $120-140 for a ton of boron combined with their transportation and 
insurance costs, the total cost of one ton of boron import reach the price of 
$250/ton, which is the price for domestic buyers.  For this reason, if domestic 
and foreign buyers are supplied with the same price, it would distract 
international competition.   
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This approach implies that domestic producers are regarded by Eti as critical 
competitors as the foreign producers. The underlying rationale, developed with 
the monopoly situation domestically, is a result of lack of comprehension 
about the utilization of minerals as a base for economic development so that 
Eti’s own revenues and success are considered as the single indicator of how 
Turkey accrues benefits from boron endowment rather than taking the 
progress of domestic actors in boron production techniques into notice.  The 
negative approach directed towards domestic producers is at the expense of 
developing the national learning capacity.  An extreme focus on eliminating 
domestic producers has led to negligence of their knowledge in production; 
and also has equalized national learning to Eti’s knowledge capacity.  
Contracting with foreign firms to build refined boron facilities, whereas the 
domestic firms which had already started to produce those products were 
exposed to closure is a significant example in the context of national learning 
ability. 
 
An important reason which has contributed to the expansion of Eti’s 
monopolistic power at the expense of domestic private producers is the 
success of state monopoly in raising boron prices, increasing its share of world 
production and increasing its boron revenues For instance, while in the pre-
1978 period prices of boron products had been between $40-60 per ton, in 
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1989 the prices of the same products reached to $150-200 per ton and in 1999 
the prices has reached to $290-295 (Karakoç, 2004: 23).  Such positive figures 
have not only consolidated but also justified Eti’s competence in following its 
own strategies on account of its monopolistic position.   
 
In the long-run, the achievement of Turkey in the world boron market needs to 
be evaluated according to the diversity, quality and distinction of its products 
rather than entirely according to the market share that it gained immediately as 
a result of capturing large deposits under state monopoly.  The difference 
between the market share of Eti in world boron production and its share in 
world boron revenues reveals the necessity to utilize efficient policy 
instruments that are inherent to company strategies for moving into higher 
value-added production.    
 
 
4.2.2. Overprotecting the state domain of boron 
 
In the period after nationalization and up to present, the international 
economic and political implications of who gains control over boron resources 
explains how boron deposits are viewed as a potential developmental asset.  
The consumption of mineral commodities is closely linked to the level of 
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industrial activity; accordingly presents the economic opportunities of 
commodity sales in a given domestic market.  Beside to this, international 
economic and political value of a commodity presents export opportunities 
and sometimes political leverage for the commodity owner countries.  Being 
in a more sophisticated world market -different from the experiences of 
today’s developed countries- the resource rich developing countries are more 
bounded with the dynamics of the world market.  In the boron case, while US 
has developed its boron deposits in relation to its industrial activity, widened 
the usage fields of boron and advanced world boron trade, it also has created 
the international opportunities to be utilized by itself.  Through its boron 
deposits and developing boron industry, the ability to control supply and price 
mechanisms has given the country a leader position in the world boron market.  
In other words, being not only an important producer, but also a significant 
consumer of boron has made US to be the most dominant actor in the world 
boron market.  Since the 1900s, at least half of the and usually 2/3 of the 
reported boron production in US has been consumed within the country. For 
instance, in 2001, 650 million tons of the total production of 536 million tons 
was consumed by various domestic industries in US (Buckingham, et al, 
2005).  
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Given the fact that Turkey is still a developing country, which implies that 
Turkish industry is behind that of major boron consuming countries, the 
evolution of boron industry has not been a respond to domestic demand forces.  
During both the pre-nationalization period and the period after 1978, the 
production incentives has been occurred and developed in correspondence to 
international boron demand.  For example in 2001, only 1/15 of the boron 
revenues was derived from internal sales (DTM, 2003: 16).  Since Turkey is 
not among the major boron consumers in the world due to the capacity of its 
domestic boron consuming industries, the utilization of the deposits orients 
towards world market opportunities.  
 
At the preliminary stage while the state monopoly holds a significant position 
in the global market by capturing mining and production rights, it starts to take 
additional measures which are complementary to protecting and strengthening 
its position in the global market.  This expansive trend, which develops as the 
domestic attitude of the state monopoly, also ascribes the cost of research and 
development activities and investment in knowledge and human capital to the 
state.  In order to achieve long-run success in the natural resource industries, 
Blomström and Kokko (2002:1) indicates the significance of public policies 
and company strategies that create skills and competence that are needed to 
remain competitive in the face of changing technologies.  In the case of a state 
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monopoly, as the same actor is responsible to generate policies and develop 
company strategies, the knowledge and skills used by the industry need to be 
continuously updated by the state in response to changes in competitive 
environment and moving into productions with higher value-added needs to be 
the top priority of the official policy.   
 
While the creation of a state monopoly eliminates the domestic competitive 
forces, it contributes to the stability of world market in terms of increasing 
predictability of price and supply levels.  As a result, Eti is able to derive 
higher benefits from a boron market, where the number of suppliers have 
decreased.  On the other hand, contributing to the stability has a positive 
impact on the side of the existing producers in the world boron market.  As the 
boron prices become more convenient to control and manipulate by few 
producers, the position of the foreign competitors are also strengthened. 
Substantially controllable and high prices in a market of few producers makes 
the mining and production activities of the competitors economically more 
feasible and sustainable through decreasing the level of uncertainty in the 
commodity markets.   For this reason, the genuine area of competition in the 
global boron market appears to take place in high value-added production 
which is apparent at the income shares of each producer from its sales of 
highly processed products. 
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4.3. The public opinion and the views of prominent domestic actors 
 
The concept of strategic mineral ascribed to boron has shaped the public 
opinion and the views of prominent domestic actors, including political, 
judicial and business figures, in conformity with the state-owned production.  
Defining boron as a strategic mineral started in 1958 with the placement of 
boron on the strategic minerals list of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls “COCOM”.  Following the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet 
Union in 1957, the NATO member states and Japan developed COCOM in 
order to regulate and limit exports to Warsaw Pact, especially of the goods 
related to military activities.  In this context, boron exports to Warsaw Pact 
were prohibited between 1958 and 1961 for the reason that rocket and flight 
fuels are usage areas for boron.  Although boron was removed from the 
strategic mineral list in 1963, definition of boron and evaluations about its 
importance has evolved around this concept in Turkey.   
 
In line with the developments related to hydrogen energy, the importance of 
boron in terms of bringing solutions to such problems as storage, 
transportation and security of hydrogen systems has contributed to the 
consolidation of strategic mineral concept in Turkey.  The usage areas for 
boron like energy production, heat storage, fuel cells beside to the areas like 
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nuclear applications, rocket and flight fuels have together become the main 
point of government authorities, political parties, prominent business unions, 
media and the public opinion (Çınkı, 2001; Güler, 2002; MMO, 2002; 
EtiMine, 2004).  The consensus about the strategic importance of boron has 
carried the questions or critiques about the state-owned production and 
policies into a realm of concern that narrow the point of views under a state 
versus opportunist private enterprises or state versus foreign competitors 
discussions. Accordingly, preserving the boron wealth under state 
guardianship with labels such as “petroleum of the 21st century” has surpassed 
the importance of the means through which the country can turn this mineral 
wealth into economic gains.  As the notion of preservation and protection of 
boron wealth has gone beyond the utilization aims, it has prevented the 
development of a national boron industry by the joint endeavor of state and 
private sector. 
 
About the supervision of the state enterprise in terms of checking its activities 
that expose difficulties for private boron producers, the decisions and advisory 
opinions of state institutions such as Competition Authority and Council of 
State are reluctant to cause an amendment to Eti’s sphere of activity.  Bor 
Sanayi Dış Ticaret Ltd. Şti, a domestic firm which produced borax –a type of 
refined boron- with ore supplies from Eti, applied to Competition Authority 
 90 
with the claim that the state-enterprise Eti Holding abused its monopoly 
position in the domestic boron market by supplying the firm at higher prices 
than its foreign customers. In the context of the Competition Law, Eti was 
conducting unequal treatment by setting the price for domestic customers at 
$230/ton while it supplied its own works at $42/ton and its foreign customers 
at $141/ton. According to the claimant, any Turkish citizen or firm had right to 
buy Eti’s products on equal terms with the foreign customers.  In response to 
the claims, the decision of the Competition Authority in 2000 asserted that Eti 
Holding is not covered within the scope of Competition Law since it is using 
monopoly right based on law; and therefore the Authority did not start an 
investigation. Following, the same firm applied to Council of State by 
demanding annulment of this decision.   
 
In 2003, Council of State declined the demand for annulment by confirming 
that Eti’s monopoly right covered not only mining but also processing of 
boron by state hand.  This decision is contrary to the institution’s advisory 
opinion in 2000 when it asserted that there is not a legal obstacle for domestic 
producers to process the boron that they buy from Eti; and Turkish citizens 
and firms have right to buy Eti’s products on equal terms with foreign 
customers. Although domestic boron processing firms were not legally closed 
after the nationalization of mining rights, with the decisions of Competition 
 91 
Authority (2000) and Council of State (2003), the legal basis for further 
processing the products of Eti by the domestic private producers has come 
under question.   
 
 
4.4. Privatization discussions, attempts and reactions 
 
The letter of intent submitted to IMF by government of Turkey in 2000 
envisaged the transfer of Eti Holding to Privatization Administration with 
some other state economic enterprises as a part of the privatization program.  
In accordance with the letter, Privatization High Commission issued its 
decision that comprised Eti Holding within privatization program and 
envisaged the completion of preparatory works in 6 months.  This decision 
after its publication on the Official Gazette, led to indignation in the country.  
Various domestic institutions, organizations, political parties, trade 
associations, labor unions and NGOs organized symposiums, panels, press 
meetings and issued declarations in order to provide annulment of the 
privatization decision (Karakoç, 2004: 24). As a result of the increasing 
pressure form public opinion, the privatization decision was declined after 6 
months of its declaration.   
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The reaction to privatization has taken its basis from country’s long tradition 
of state –owned enterprises and also from being an attempt related to IMF 
program.  Despite the roots of the reaction, state’s mineral enterprises within 
the Eti Holding other than boron, was transferred to Privatization 
Administration in 3 years of time.  Besides to being one of the rare state 
economic enterprises that is highly profitable, privatization of Eti Boron drew 
significant reaction because of the mineral’s strategic importance and  related  
potential  for  the  country’s development. By  the  few opponents  to  the 
existing Eti policies, which are made up of prior private boron producers, 
privatization attempt is regarded even weirder given the condition that they 
had been excluded from boron production. Especially the critiques and 
oppositions regarding Eti’s domestic policies and practices directed at private 
producers had never raised the privatization of mining licenses including 
extraction and basic mining activities. From this aspect, privatization attempt 
was quite a radical decision and also was an outcome of external pressures 
rather than an internal necessity.  The decisions of the Competition Authority 
(2000) and the Council of State (2003) which denied to cause a change to Eti’s 
policy regarding the right of domestic producers to benefit from same terms of 
purchase like the foreign buyers is verifying that the privatization decision was 
not a result of internal necessity which aimed to improve economic efficiency 
or to foster contributions to national economy from boron resources. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
UTILIZATION OF BORON BY TURKEY 
 
 
5.1. Turkey’s boron trade, revenues and market share 
 
Following the nationalization of boron mining in Turkey, country’s share in 
world boron production has had a steady increase.  For example, the share in 
production rose to %33.4 in 2001 while it was %16 in 1970.  In 2000, total 
boron revenues increased to $208 million while it was $83,4million in 1978.  
The rise in production and revenues has been realized in response to the 
increase in world demand rather than as a result of creating new usage areas 
for boron by Turkey or domestic demand growth.  In view of the 
circumstances, the progress in boron production and revenues has been an 
outcome of Turkey’s ability in taking advantage of the developments in boron 
consuming industries outside the country.   
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In case of the knowledge in boron production technologies, which is the 
second determinant of Turkey’s ability in deriving benefits from international 
boron demand, the country has been relatively weak.  For long years exports in 
raw and lightly processed boron has surpassed production and exports of 
refined and specialty boron, which are products of high technology.  Table VI 
presents the relative weights of raw/ lightly processed and refined/ highly 
processed boron in Turkey’s boron production. 
 
 
Table VI   Boron production in Turkey 
 
Raw/Lightly Processed Boron 
 
 
Refined/Highly Processed Boron 
 
Year 
Quantity 
(ton) 
Revenue ($) Quantity (ton) Revenue ($) 
1989 820.077 172.500.869 169.101 59.461.693 
1990 681.667 147.760.148 143.850 53.317.268 
1991 637.524 133.028.121 140.203 48.633.368 
1992 617.739 130.813.254 196.812 70.361.680 
1993 613.012 120.472.646 195.675 65.720.021 
1994 622.194 120.866.940 245.046 81.550.597 
1995 684.404 134.135.409 241.838 82.176.705 
1996 735.720 140.975.909 249.943 85.220.914 
1997 731.618 136.095.150 313.702 101.191.357 
1998 655.755 123.944.546 296.183 95.994.684 
1999 653.480 121.318.868 360.703 114.775.118 
2000 567.760 102.023.724 341.309 106.578.614 
Source: DTM, 2003. 
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As presented in Figure III, Turkey’s boron production on the basis of amount 
has shown an increasing trend; so that by 2000’s Turkey’s total boron 
production have reached that of USA.  Although production amounts are seen 
proximate, the share in world boron sales has been %20-23 for Turkey and 
%65-70 for USA (DTM, 2003: 9).   
 
The proximity between amounts and the gap between revenues is a result of 
the fact that USA consumes the boron it produces for refined boron 
production, while Turkey continues to have lightly processed boron as an 
important share of its sales and lags behind USA in terms of diversity in 
refined products.  Apart from Turkey’s %20-23 share in the world boron 
market of $1.5billion, which is made up boron concentrates and refined boron, 
Turkey’s share in the world market of specialty boron products, which are 
high-value added products of technology and reaches up to $80-90billion, is 
around %1.  
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Figure III    Boron production in Turkey and the USA 
 
Source: DTM, 2003. 
    
 
Although boron income of the country hasn’t reached a level of making 
significant contributions to domestic economy, the production patterns that 
have an increasing trend for refined products after 2002, is promising for 
development of national boron industry.  When distribution of boron sales on 
the basis of quantity in 2006 is analyzed, it is seen that the rate of concentrate 
product sales is %25 of total boron sales and the rate of refined and refined 
equivalence product sales (refined product is %62, refined equivalence product 
is %13) is %75 of total boron sales. Of total boron sales in 2002, the share of 
concentrate boron was %46 whereas refined boron product sales were %49. In 
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4 years of time, the substantial increase in the amount of refined boron sales 
also reflected in Eti’s revenues from total boron sales. Figure IV shows the 
boron sales revenues of Eti Mine between 2000 and 2006. 
 
 
Figure IV    Eti Mine Sales ($) 
 
 
 
The major share in revenues from boron sales by Eti Mine is derived from 
exports.  Export revenue in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 was 
respectively $215million, $208million,$186million, $207million, $252million, 
Source: Eti Mine, 2006. 
        Boron concentrate       Ground colemanite        Refined Boron      Total  
 98 
$299million and $365million.   The rise in boron exports by %11 on the basis 
of quantity and by %15 on the basis of revenue in 2006 was realized in parallel 
with the upsurge of world boron demand.  Accordingly, the increase in the 
export revenues is reflected in the increase of boron sales after 2002.   
 
Due to the capacity increase and utilization rate for refined boron production 
following the year 2002, the share of refined boron exports showed an 
increasing trend that on the basis of quantity it raised by %96 and on the basis 
of revenue raised by %99 in 2005 compared to 2002 (EtiMine, 2005: 14).  
Table VII indicates the improvement in the share of refined boron in Eti 
Mine’s sales comparing the figures of 2002 with 2006. 
 
 
Table VII    Eti Mine Boron Sales, 2002 and 2006 
2002 2006 
Based on Ton Based on Sum 
 
 
Products 
 
 
 
 
Ton 
 
Sum $ Ton Ratio of 
Increase 
Sum$ Ratio of 
Increase 
Boron 
Concentrate 
371.871 67.691.213 347.600 -%7 62.213.452 -%8 
Ground 
Colemanite 
44.865 16.782.988 181.912 %305 62.053.611 %270 
Refined 
Boron 
396.028 116.684.537 867.991 %119 264.359.719 %127 
Total  812.764 201.158.737 1.397.503 %72 388.626.779 %93 
Source: Eti Mine, 2006. 
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In 2002, production capacity for refined boron was 730.000 ton/year while the 
capacity utilization rate was around %60.  As a result of the investments in 
2003 and 2004, the production capacity increased to 831.000ton/year in 2005.  
With an overcapacity production rate in 2005, refined boron output doubled in 
2005 compared to 2002 (EtiMine, 2005: 8).  Table makes it more clear that 
refinery of boron doubles the price of concentrates.  In parallel with the 
increase in the share of refined boron production and sales, total revenue 
proved a sharp rise in 2006.  The increasing trend in production of refined 
boron is promising provided that the concern for processing activities are 
maintained and knowledge input to the products are increased.   
 
 
5.2. Bureaucratic limitations 
 
Bureaucratic limitations are the institutional barriers to growth that inhibit in 
state enterprises as a result of the political connection with company strategies, 
recruitment processes, financial flows or distribution of gains.  Based on the 
notion of ‘state enterprise’, these companies are vulnerable to political 
interventions in the name of generating national benefits rather than 
maintaining the ability choose the best mechanisms and strategies for itself 
within the context of business dynamics.  Appointment of the high officials is 
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the main source of the limitations and problems related to the functioning of 
the enterprises because the management becomes basically a reflection of 
politicization.  If the high-ranking officials of the enterprise are refrained from 
competence in developing new strategies and making own reforms, it becomes 
more difficult to keep pace with the changes in the competitive market.   
 
The top management of state enterprise Eti has also been exposed to such 
limitations in its functioning in accordance with the changes in governments.  
The extremely unsteady structure of the executive committees of Eti underlies 
the inability of forging of any kind of definite and consistent policymaking 
and effective execution the policies. Since 1978, only 6 of the 14 general 
directors stayed in their office for three years or more.  The political dynamics 
in the executive branches of the enterprise is reflected in the change of all 
permanent staff, who is working in the upper executive branches, at least once 
every three years.  Politically connected changes in the personnel rather than a 
merit-based recruitment leads to loss of learning process and experiences of 
the existing officials and therefore causes the waste of human capital. Given 
the stock of human capital is an important determinant of the rate of growth 
(Romer, 1991: 71), politically-induced changes of the officials in Eti has had a 
negative impact on the utilization of boron minerals. According to Gylfason 
(2000: 6-7) “Nations that believe that natural capital is their most important 
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asset may develop a false sense of security and become negligent about the 
accumulation of human capital”.  The failure of the governments in their 
approach to human capital lacked the enterprise from competent 
administrators with the necessary understanding of economics and business 
operations; therefore delayed the elaboration of boron industry below the 
expectations in Turkey.   
 
Strong political patronage over Eti together with the characterization of the 
enterprise as an extension of state more than a business enterprise also has led 
to several other limitations on the effectiveness As Por (2003: 8) suggests, 
related to the non-transparent and weak structure of decision-making bodies, 
adjustments in respect to quick changes in world market become difficult. The 
complex decision-making procedures and multiple political authorities having 
influence in these central bodies impede the enterprise from making day-to-
day responses and marketing strategies to global trends in boron market.  Lack 
of continuity in administrative boards has contributed this inability.  
 
The questions on the performance of the enterprise are to a large extent 
covered by the increase in the prices of products after nationalization.  The 
evaluations on the performance of Eti depend on the reports of the same 
enterprise without an external auditing mechanism. This shortcoming also 
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creates transparency problems for the reason that objective information about 
the activities and performance of the enterprise is difficult to reach.   The state 
owned enterprises shouldn’t be exempt from the application of general rules 
and regulations, especially from competition law for efficient management 
purposes (OECD, 2005: 189).  When the Council of State has confirmed the 
ruling of the Competition Authority, which agreed that Eti is not covered with 
the Competition Law, this ruling deprived the enterprise without a checking 
mechanism for its domestic activities as well.  
  
The general problems of state owned enterprises, which emerge from the 
injection of politics into a business entity that is initially designed for 
economic purposes, have decreased the performance of Turkey in utilizing its 
boron deposits. Political appointments, interference in management, 
inattention about monitoring the investment decisions, and insufficient 
checking of the execution and performance of Eti has put negative impacts on 
the ability of Turkey to derive the expected results of the assigned policy. 
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5.3. Marketing strategies 
 
Marketing strategy is fundamental to outward-looking boron production of 
Turkey in terms of capturing more share in world boron market and 
correspondingly higher share from boron revenues.  Thanks to its rich 
reserves, low production costs and geographical proximity to major markets, 
Turkey has become the major supplier of boron ore in the world without 
developing a decisive strategy to market its products.  Being the major 
supplier of ore has increased the country’s share in world boron market; but its 
share in revenues has not increased equally.   
    
The inconsistencies in marketing are part of the deficiencies in the general 
boron policy of Turkey.  While Eti has not allowed domestic entrepreneurs to 
buy ore or processed boron for producing any kind of refined boron according 
to competition rationale, it has maintained to supply foreign customers without 
any distinction over products.  In this context, its customers, which are able to 
buy ore from Eti, are also able to re-export although Eti has sales agents and 
distributors around the world.  What makes the re-exports of Eti’s customers 
profitable is revealed in the explanation of an ex-general director of Eti as he 
informed that Eti provides boron to some customers at lower prices than it 
provides to its own sales agent Etimine S.A.  (Arslan, 2003).   
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In this context, Eti has taken advantage of the ore demand in the world market 
to increase its sales share per ton not per income. Deficiency in the marketing 
strategy can also be observed when comparing the prices of Eti’s products 
with that of other producers. For example, Turkey has lost a part of its sales 
share in French market to Italy and in German market to USA although Eti’s 
prices have been more favorable compared to competitor suppliers. In the light 
of these examples, Turkey needs to develop more marketing intelligence with 
qualified human capital other than using price cuts as a part of marketing 
strategy.  
 
The consequences of the shortcomings in the marketing strategy are not 
limited to the loss of returns in the complicated web of sales agents, 
distributors and privileged customers.  The purpose to increase Eti’s exports 
had brought with lower prices for foreign customers than domestic ones, 
therefore the concern for Eti’s income had surpassed the concern for 
developing domestic boron industry.  Lower prices for foreign producers had 
put domestic boron processing companies at an unfavorable position in the 
international competition.  While Eti was eliminating its domestic competitors 
and increasing its marketing share in the world, at the same it has contributed 
to the growth of foreign producers, which are the competitors of Eti’s itself in 
the world market.  For example, domestic firms are prevented to produce 
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‘perborates’, for the reason that the monopoly established by the law does not 
allow to produce any of the products of Eti.  On the other hand, Eti has 
supplied ore to the major producers of perborates in the world, which in turn 
supplies the ‘perborates’ demand in Turkey.  Lowering the prices for foreign 
customers in order to increase its market share has eventually caused Turkey 
to become an importer of perborates, which make up %99 of its boron product 
imports.   
 
The negative consequences of the marketing strategy on Eti’s income and also 
on the development of domestic boron industry reveal the necessity of the 
concern for improving business intelligence besides to increasing production.  
For Eti’s income, the instabilities in the marketing tools are correctable flaws 
if sound strategies are complemented with specialized human capital.  On the 
other hand in order to correct the impacts of marketing policy on domestic 
entrepreneurs, the overall boron policy needs a revision in a way that promotes 
the domestic processing of boron by actors beside to state enterprise. 
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5.4. Investment 
 
The most important feature of the investment decisions is that the capital 
intensive projects are irreversible.  Investments of state enterprises, once 
decided upon, shall cover the burden it has made to national budget by being 
carried out effectively and also flexibly to the changes in market and products.  
Making the right choice in the scope, location, timing and technology of a 
project, requires understanding of market forces, experience in responding 
them, trading-off between alternatives and predicting the direction of future 
change, and therefore is the main tool for productive and development 
promoting investments.  
 
 In making these calculations, two different limitations have played role on the 
investments for boron industry in Turkey.  Firstly, since the ownership of the 
means of production and wealth by state enterprises is not simply economic 
power but also a political power (Walstedt, 1980: 13), investment promotion 
for boron processing industries has not been vested in purely economic basis.  
The general policy on boron, which has established an over-regulatory 
management through state hand, has generated limitations on domestic 
investment.  For example, even when private entrepreneurship was 
forthcoming for some refined boron products, the state enterprise invested for 
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the production of the same products; and private producers were pushed out of 
the market based on the interpretations about the scope of Eti’s monopoly 
right. As a result, the investments for processing of boron have been limited to 
state’s ability. 
   
Second limitation has been rooted in Turkey’s overall development levels in 
industry, science and technology.  Investment for boron products with high 
returns doesn’t depend on solely the capital to finance the projects but also 
depends on the knowledge and human capital of the domestic economy. 
Finding of new usage areas for boron products to a large extent appears in 
response to the developments in various industries of the developed countries. 
Establishing productive technologies and diversifying towards high-value 
added boron products improves in parallel to the industrial development level 
associated with knowledge accumulation in science and technology. In parallel 
with the industrial development level in Turkey, production high-value added 
boron products have shown an increasing trend. This trend is correlated with 
the rising concern for improving the capacity of existing facilities and making 
new facility investments for boron technologies, productive methods, and 
high-value added boron chemicals.  With the activation of on-going and 
scheduled investments, Eti’s production capacity in boron chemicals and 
equivalent products is targeted to be increased by %80 to 1.499.000 ton/year 
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from existing capacity of 831.000ton/year (EtiMaden, 2006: 50). The capacity 
for refined boron products in Turkey by the late 1990s has been increasing. 
Following the investments for the capacity in refined boron production, the 
share of refined boron sales showed an increasing trend higher than raw boron 
sales.  Increasing share of investment for refined boron within Eti’s whole 
investment projects is a reflection of the knowledge and experience gained by 
Eti in production technologies and also a reflection of industrial and technical 
capacity of Turkey.  The on-going investment projects for establishing boron 
oxide, borax pentahydrate and agricultural boron production facilities, 
increasing the capacity of borax decahydrate and boric acid facility and 
building a new packaging facility to minimize the transportation costs and loss 
of product are the examples of how investments are determined by knowledge 
and experience accumulated by a country in years.    
 
 
5.5. Domestic boron consumption 
 
Gains from utilization of boron deposits in Turkey have mainly derived from 
export gains since boron consumption in Turkey is insignificant compared to 
the boron consuming countries that Eti sells its products. Domestic private 
sector is not promoted to consume boron ore or refined boron as an input for 
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producing other refined products.  Therefore the consumption of boron in 
Turkey depends on the usage of Eti’s products as an input for own production 
and on the usage of Eti’s products by domestic industries as an input as it is 
bought.  Consumption trends by domestic private sector are fundamentally 
determined by the potentials of existing industries.  Glass sector, ceramic-frit 
sector and detergent-cleaning sector are the major boron consuming sectors in 
Turkey with a share of %36, %30 and %26 respectively.  The remaining share 
of %10 is consumed in other sectors.  In 2006, domestic boron sales of Eti 
have reached to %5 of its total sales that returned around $20million revenue.  
Beside to Eti’s supply to domestic industries, Turkey imports perborates, a 
kind of refined boron, to consume in glass and detergent sector.  The major 
suppliers of perborates to Turkey are Italy, Germany, Spain and Slovenia.   
 
 
5.6. Research and Development 
 
Long-run success in minerals industry requires acquisition of knowledge that 
is needed to remain competitive in the face of changing usage areas and 
production technologies. Adopting a value-added strategy with heavy 
emphasis on R&D has an essential role in utilizing boron minerals for 
industrial and economic purposes.  The determining role of knowledge in 
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utilizing boron results from the basic physical and chemical features of the 
mineral.  Usage of boron in diverse industries depends on its synthesis with 
other elements and materials.  Value of boron compounds and special boron 
products vary according to their chemical composition.  Therefore the price of 
a boron product is not determined according to the amount of boron mineral 
used in it, but according to the input of chemical and industrial knowledge 
used in its production.  In light of these facts for boron mineral, development 
of Turkey’s boron industry depends on the knowledge creation for more 
advanced products rather than geological endowment. 
 
The studies for boron production were pioneered by the Marmara Research 
Center under the structure of Scientific and Technical Research Council of 
Turkey in 1973.  The studies for boron chemicals conducted by TUBITAK-
MAM and Istanbul Technical University contributed to production of refined 
boron products by Eti.  Until 2000s, almost all of the knowledge on boron 
chemicals in Turkey was developed with the studies of TUBITAK-MAM, 
Istanbul Technical University and Middle East Technical University, which 
accounted for %21, %27 and %11 of all R&D studies.  The R&D on boron 
chemicals started to spread to various universities and other institutions and to 
develop more systematically by 2000s, which corresponds to the years that 
Turkey’s refined boron production has increased. With the cooperation of state 
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universities and the Chamber of Mining Engineers, international boron 
symposiums, which gathered the studies on boron chemicals, have started to 
take place with the beginning of 2002. In 2003, National Boron Research 
Institute (Boren) was founded in order to organize and sponsor scientific 
studies to widen the consumption areas of boron products as well as the 
scientific studies for the development of new boron products.  Boren also 
supports R&D studies of companies, universities and research centers. The 
institution is also designed to encourage the consumption of boron products in 
domestic markets by supplying scientific and practical knowledge to potential 
customers.  In 2005, EtiMaden, with collaboration of Boren, organized 1st 
National Boron Workshop with the participation of representatives from the 
institutions related to boron, universities and private sector.   
   
In line with the historical development of R&D on boron in Turkey, which 
started in 1970s, the level of boron industry has lagged far behind the major 
boron chemicals producers in the world.  As the research institutes and 
universities has accounted for almost all of the advanced research, adaptation 
of knowledge to industry has also followed behind the foreign producers due 
to the industrial development level in Turkey.  As Wright and Czelusta (2002: 
p.14) indicates that “mineral development as a knowledge industry evokes 
institutional relationship among government agencies, academic institutions 
 112 
and private corporations”, the accumulation of scientific knowledge and the 
rise in R&D studies, development of a comprehensive framework for 
combining the accumulated knowledge and promotion of studies under a 
coordinating institution is promising for utilization of boron in Turkey. What 
is necessary the way forward is the efforts in adapting boron knowledge to 
domestic boron consuming industries. Together with the development of 
knowledge, transferring knowledge into practical value with industrial 
adaptability is central to economic growth.   
  
 
 5.7. Contribution of boron endowment to Turkey’s economy 
 
Contribution of boron endowment to Turkish economy has been far below the 
economic importance attached to the mineral. The shares of industrial, 
agricultural and mining exports of Turkey have respectively been %86.2, 
%11.4, and %2.4 in 2006. Total export revenues of Turkey were $85 billion in 
2006.  This number is extremely important in comparing it to the world market 
for raw and refined boron products, which makes $1.2- 1.5 billion.  Unless 
Turkey remains as the sole producer of boron in the world with an ability to 
manipulate the prices for own interest, the potential for Turkey to benefit from 
boron production is limited around $1billion export revenues.  
 113 
Since the nationalization of boron production, total export revenues from 
boron has been approximately $5 billion in 30 years with $200-250 million 
annual revenue in last ten years.  In the recent years, the increasing trend of 
refined boron production has reflected to the export revenues, which reached 
to $365 million. Compared to Turkey’s income from mining exports, which 
was equal to $2 billion in 2006, revenues from boron exports appears to hold 
%18.25 of total exports in mining.  On the contrary to the favorable share of 
boron exports within mining exports, the revenues from boron exports are 
equal to only %0.4 of total export revenues of Turkey in 2006.  With these 
figures, production of raw and refined boron is a source of export revenues; 
but far from making major contributions to domestic economy. 
   
The contributions of boron endowment to domestic economy have so far fallen 
short of expectations.  In order to accomplish a balanced approach in setting 
the profit expectations, what is needed to be done is a genuine assessment of 
economic potential of boron resources.  Being the major producer and exporter 
of raw boron, boron concentrates or refined boron has very limited growth 
potential for Turkey in the context of actual size of Turkish economy and the 
revenue potential for these products in the world market.   On the other hand, 
specialty boron products, which are products of high technology and equal to 
$60-80 billion in world economy, emerge as a real potential to specialize in.  
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According to Romer (1991: 72), “technological change arises in large part 
because of intentional actions taken by people who respond to market 
incentives”. Conformably, the specialty boron products have been developed 
in line with the prominent industries of specific countries.  Reconciling the 
private sector with boron production in Turkey will be the fundamental pace in 
benefiting from this potential; because the production of specialty boron 
products appertains to the endeavors of diverse industries consuming boron.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Resource abundance and wealth are direct sources neither of development nor 
economic under-performance.  The instruments by which the resources are 
utilized in order to generate income to the economy and by which the resource 
wealth is re-distributed, better determine how the resource endowment and 
resource wealth will affect the performance of the overall economy.  Building 
comprehensive public policies which utilize resource abundance for 
development of human capital and advanced research activities can lessen 
dependency on primary commodity exports and pave the way for 
diversification around a value-added production and exports base.  In this 
context, this thesis tried to display the utilization of boron deposits in Turkey 
and to elaborate Turkey’s ability in driving economic benefits from boron 
production.  The  boron  case of  Turkey  reveals that  abundance of a  mineral 
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does not necessarily lead to correspondent revenues from its production and 
exports unless some distinctive value is added to the products.  
 
This thesis establishes three modes of mineral management, which are 
insufficient regulation, state coordination, and state acquisition/over-
regulation. The legal and regulatory framework governing resource ownership, 
extraction, production and development basically encourages the "chosen" 
goals, while at the same time; it discourages and restricts the use of alternative 
utilization models that might have yielded other benefits and costs.  The 
negative side-effects and the shortcomings of the institutional setting, if not 
minimized or compensated by the chosen model, may slow down or hinder the 
development of the resource industry, or even distort the overall economy 
because of misallocation of revenues, over-dependence on commodity exports 
or reluctance to promote domestic development. The advantages or flaws of 
the institutional design and the positive or negative externalities of the 
regulatory framework play the prevailing role in generating economic wealth 
from resources.   
 
According to the boron policy and related institutions, which basically include 
ownership structure and mining rights, this thesis places the boron production 
in Turkey under the category of state-acquisition/over-regulation. Most of the 
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questions about the success of the state-managed mineral production stem 
from the general problems of state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that the management in the over-regulatory framework need 
not be dysfunctional management and the problems related to the state-owned 
enterprises are not necessarily endemic to state-dominated mineral 
management. On the other hand, even if the over-regulatory design is made 
consistent with an effective and functional management, it generates negative 
externalities for technological improvement which are inherent to the 
monopolistic model.  The exclusion of multiple private actors from the 
industry can slow down the national innovation that comes from competition 
dynamics and the scale of research activities. Limiting the number of the 
actors involved in production activities entails a decrease in the number of 
actors involved in knowledge accumulation, which militates against the notion 
of 'learning by doing'.  The alienation of the private sector from mineral 
processing also alienates it from the mineral science and production 
technologies; in other terms, monopoly of mineral production results in 
monopoly of knowledge production. 
 
The economic and political significance of the resource, internationally and 
domestically, presents the potential benefits that are to be gained by the 
producer country.  Adoption of the most suitable institutional setting requires a 
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comprehensive understanding of international market forces and also the 
opportunities and risks associated with alternative regulations.  In this regard, 
the institutional design should be established appropriately to realize the 
potential benefits.  This thesis finds out that there will not be a prescribed 
contribution of boron deposits to economic growth of Turkey unless the 
resources are associated with comprehensive policies that are placing the 
investments in knowledge and human capital in the forefront. While the 
current world market for boron ore and compounds totals $1.2 billion, 
abundant boron reserves cannot serve as an engine for economic development 
even if Turkey supplies this market by itself.  On the other hand, the use of 
boron in nuclear energy, the aircraft and space industry, in computer and 
mobile phone batteries and in automobile energy cells highlights the 
importance of boron for advanced technologies and industries.  Technology 
and know-how is the key determinant for the volume of the economic turnover 
in the special boron products sectors. 
 
Long-run success in minerals industry requires acquisition of knowledge that 
is needed to remain competitive in the face of changing usage areas and 
production technologies.  Therefore, in the long-run, the achievement of 
Turkey in the world boron market should be assessed according to the 
diversity, quality and distinction of its products.  Adopting a value-added 
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strategy with heavy emphasis on R&D has an essential role in utilizing boron 
minerals for industrial and economic purposes.  In this regard, the thesis 
reaches the conclusion that Turkey needs to find a balanced approach between 
state-managed and market-led production by avoiding or compensating for 
both state and market failures in a way that is conducive to diversify into high 
value added boron products.  Reconciling the domestic private sector with 
boron production in Turkey will be the fundamental pace in benefiting from 
boron endowment.   
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